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The United States has been experiencing a secular decline in the pace of busi-
ness formation and young firm activity shares in recent decades. U.S. productivity
growth also slowed down during the same period. This thesis studies two questions.
First, what are the driving forces and long-term growth implications of the observed
trends? Second, how is the creative destruction process translated into the measured
cost of living?
Using a longitudinal worker-firm matched dataset from the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, I document that in the innovation intensive high-tech sector, the decline in
young firm activity shares is accompanied by: 1) a decline in the growth rate of the
demand for skills, and 2) a flattening of the life cycle of skilled labor accumulation
of high-tech firms. By developing an innovation-based firm dynamics model that is
consistent with the micro-level skilled labor accumulation over the firm life cycle, I
show that rising frictions in skilled labor adjustment can explain the joint evolution
of young firm employment shares and demand for skills. These frictions influence
productivity growth through affecting the stock of human capital firms possess. A
calibrated model shows that a rise in skilled labor adjustment costs lowers produc-
tivity growth by 75 basis points in the high-tech sector. A rise in entry costs, on
the other hand, is not likely the main driver for declining young firm activities, as it
implies an increase in demand for skills. Finally, productivity gain (loss) from real-
location can be offset by the general equilibrium effects of reallocation on aggregate
demand for skills.
The impact of innovation on welfare depends critically on taking into account
the impact of innovation on the cost of living. Building upon the framework of Red-
ding and Weinstein (2020), I estimate the exact cost of living in the U.S. consumer
goods sector using the Nielsen Retail Scanner data over the period of 2006 to 2015.
The estimated inflation rate considering product turnover and taste shocks is one
percent lower than the tradition CPI measure. Furthermore, I show that the direc-
tion of the bias in traditional price indices is determined by the correlation between
the initial period market share of products and relative taste shocks. Finally, the
exact price index based on a nested CES demand structure can be used to study
the contribution to the cost of living by firms of difference sizes.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Creative destruction, the process that “incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new
one” (Schumpeter (1942)), has been regarded as the essential force underlying eco-
nomic growth in market economies. In past decades, however, we observe trends
that suggest a slowdown of this creative destruction process and a slowdown in
productivity growth in the United States. This thesis looks at two issues at the
core of these observed trends: first, what are the driving forces behind the observed
trends and the implications for long-term growth; and second, how is the creative
destruction process translated into the measured cost of living. Firms, the agents
which make innovation and investment decisions, are at the center of my analysis.
In Chapter 2, I study possible connections between business dynamism and
productivity growth. Young firm activity shares, measured as the employment share
of young firms, have been declining in the U.S. and the post-2000 decline has been
particularly pronounced in the high-tech sector. Is such decline concerning and
does it imply a slowdown in long-term growth in the U.S.? Recent literature hasn’t
reached a consensus. On the one hand, labor supply side explanations argue that
declining young firm activities reflects an efficient response to broader trends such
1
as slower population growth or skill-biased technological progress which lower firm
entry rates. On the other hand, some studies argue that frictions play a role and
imply inefficiency in the economy.
To tackle this question, I look at an important but neglected angle in the lit-
erature - the human capital accumulation of firms. I document, using a longitudinal
worker-firm matched dataset (LEHD) from the U.S. Census Bureau, that the post-
2000 decline in young firm activities in the high-tech sector has been accompanied
by a decline in the growth rate of demand for skills. Furthermore, I document that
the aggregate decline in the growth of demand for skills in the high-tech sector is
driven by a decline in the speed and level of firms’ skilled labor’s accumulation over
their life cycle. As skill is the key input to innovation, changes in firms’ demand for
skills can affect the innovation process and hence productivity growth.
I then develop an innovation-based firm dynamics model that is consistent
with micro-level evidence on firms’ skilled labor accumulation. Using this model, I
show that rising frictions in firms’ skilled labor adjustment can be a major driver
behind declining young firm activities in the high-tech sector. Moreover, rising
adjustment costs could lead to a decline in productivity growth of 75 basis points
in the high-tech sector.
Adjustment frictions affect long-term growth through reducing the stock of
human capital firms possess in equilibrium. A rise in skilled labor adjustment costs
raises the marginal cost of hiring skilled labor for all firms, and leads to a decline in
the aggregate demand for skills. Such frictions hurt young firms disproportionately
more than mature firms as young firms have a higher incentive to adjust the stock
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of their skilled labor. Young firm employment shares also decline as a result. Long-
term growth is hampered in this cases as a lower stock of human capital (skill) leads
to less innovation and hence lower productivity growth.
A rise in entry costs, on the other hand, reduces the entry rate and young
firm employment share, but does not necessarily lead to lower productivity growth.
This is because incumbents’ probability of survival increases facing less threat from
entrants. An increase in the expected firm value under higher survival rates incen-
tivizes incumbents to hire more skilled labor, and the aggregate demand for skills
increases. In equilibrium, incumbents have a higher stock of skilled labor and that
leads to an increase in productivity growth.
In sum, Chapter 2 shows that rising entry costs are unlikely to be the driv-
ing force behind the decline in young firms’ employment shares as they should be
associated with a rise in demand for skills. Rising frictions in hiring skilled labor
reconcile both patterns, and are concerning as they imply lower long-term growth.
My model also suggests that the productivity gain from reallocating skilled labor
from old to young firms is not always guaranteed, as higher equilibrium destruction
rate will discourage incumbents from hiring skilled labor. This channel offsets the
gain from reallocation.
The outcome of innovations can be 1) the creation of new products and the
destruction of obsolete ones, 2) the creation and destruction of firms, 3) the im-
provement of quality of existing products, and 4) changes in product prices due to
changes in firms’ cost structure. All these will have direct impact on the cost of
living and consumer welfare. So how in practice can we capture these innovation
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outcomes in measured price indices?
Even though in the past, a large amount of research has been done to un-
derstand the role of creative destruction on long-term growth, but the work to
empirically quantify the impact of innovation on the cost of living and consumer
welfare is very limited. This gap is partly due to the lack of product-level price
and quantity data at a national scale, as well as the lack of a theoretical framework
which incorporates not only product turnover, but also time-varying demand (taste)
shocks at product level. In Chapter 3, I study the measurement of the exact cost
of living under product and firm turnover and relative taste (demand) shocks, and
study the contribution to the cost of living of firms of different sizes.
I utilize the Unified Price Index (UPI) framework proposed by Redding and
Weinstein (2020) and transaction-level price and quantity data at the national scale
from the Nielsen Retail Scanner Dataset (RMS) to measure the evolution of the exact
cost of living in the consumer goods sector in the United States. Derived from a CES
demand for a representative consumer, the UPI incorporates product turnover and
time-varying demand (taste) shocks to measured price indices. I further construct
a UPI under a nested CES demand system where there are firm entry and exit in
additional to product entry and exit, and the substitutability of goods within and
between firms is allowed to be different.
The estimated UPI suggests that there is quality improvement in consumer
products that can not be captured by traditional prices. The average annual inflation
in the consumer goods sector measured by the nested UPI is -1.0% on average from
2006 to 2015, compared to 0.03% given by the Laspeyres index. The measured UPI
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inflation rates are 2.0% and -3.1% for the food and non-food sector respectively,
compared to 3.0% and 0.0% from the Laspeyres index.
A key contribution of Redding and Weinstein (2020) is that they argue with the
existence of relative taste shocks, Sato-Vartia index is upward biased since increases
in tastes are weighted more than reductions in tastes. Such effect is equivalent to
an increase in the dispersion of market shares and hence will result in a negative
consumer valuation bias term in the UPI. I argue, instead, that the bias is not always
positive and the direction of the bias depends on the correlation between initial
period market shares and relative taste shocks. I first show this analytically in a
two-good economy and then test this result using the Nielsen data. The empirical
results support my argument.
Finally, using the nested UPI, I look at the contribution to the cost of living
by firms of different sizes. Large firms drive down the cost of living in the aggregate
economy by driving down the consumer valuation adjustment. Without the top 5
firms in each product group, the cost of living would have increased by 1.4% on an
annual basis. Meanwhile, the role of large firms is different across product groups.
In the innovation intensive sector (eg. electronics), large firms have engaged in more
active product creation and destruction which drives down the cost of living. On
the other hand, the dispersion of market shares within large firms have decreased
over time which gives rise to a positive consumer valuation adjustment. In the less
innovation intensive sector (eg. snacks), the difference between large and small firms
is not significant.
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Chapter 2: Innovation, Demand for Skills, and Productivity Growth
2.1 Introduction
1The U.S. economy has been experiencing a secular decline in the pace of
business formation and young firm activity shares in recent decades. In particular,
the post-2000 decline has been very pronounced in the high-tech sector.2 Should we
be concerned about these trends?
Recent literature hasn’t reached a consensus on what caused the decline. On
the one hand, labor supply side explanations argue that declining young firm activity
reflects an efficient response to broader trends such as slower population growth,
which leads to lower firm entry rates (Hopenhayn et al. (2018), Karahan et al.
(2019)), or skill-biased technological progress, which raises the attractiveness of
becoming a worker relative to being an entrepreneur (Salgado (2019)). On the
other hand, some studies argue that frictions may affect young firm activity (Davis
1Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no
confidential information is disclosed. The research in this paper is conducted while the author is
Special Sworn Status researcher of the US Census Bureau. This research uses data from the Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program, which was partially supported
by National Science Foundation Grants SES-9978093, SES-0339191 and ITR-0427889; National
Institute on Aging Grant AG018854; and grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
2Literature documents the secular trends include Davis et al. (2012), Hyatt and Spletzer (2013),
Decker et al. (2014a), Decker et al. (2014b), Haltiwanger et al. (2014a), Karahan et al. (2019),
among others.
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and Haltiwanger (2014), Decker et al. (2018), Akcigit and Ates (2019)). Despite
a growing literature studying these empirical trends and possible drivers behind
declining dynamism, we still don’t fully understand the underlying factors, or the
impact of declining dynamism on long-term growth.
This chapter studies the possible connections between business dynamism and
productivity growth. I focus on demand side factors that affect firms’ decision
to enter and grow. Using a longitudinal worker-firm matched dataset built from
administrative databases from the U.S. Census Bureau, I document a novel fact
about the high-tech sector: the post-2000 decline in young firm activity has been
accompanied by a decline in the growth rate of demand for skills. Furthermore, I
document that the aggregate decline in the growth of demand for skills is driven by
a decline in the speed and level of firms’ skilled labor’s accumulation over their life
cycle.
Motivated by these empirical facts, I develop an innovation-based firm dy-
namics model that is consistent with micro-level evidence on firms’ skilled labor
accumulation. Using this model, I study the joint evolution of young firm employ-
ment shares and demand for skills in the high-tech sector. My quantitative exercises
show that rising adjustment costs in firms’ skilled labor adjustment drive down both
the young firm employment share and firms’ demand for skills, as observed in the
data. Moreover, rising adjustment costs lead to a decline in productivity growth of
75 basis points. An increase in entry costs, on the other hand, is not likely to be the
dominant driver for the decline in the young firm employment share, as it predicts
a counterfactual increase in the demand for skills.
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The contribution to the literature is twofold. First, empirically, this chapter
is the first to examine demand for skills in the high-tech sector and to document
the post-2000 slowdown in its growth. It is also the first to study firms’ life cycle
of skilled labor accumulation and how this has changed over time. Second, theo-
retically, I develop an innovation-based endogenous growth model that is consistent
with firms’ skilled labor accumulation over their life cycle, and use this model to
study the joint evolution of the young firm employment share and demand for skills
and the implication of rising adjustment costs for productivity growth.
I estimate demand for skills based on the canonical framework developed by
Katz and Murphy (1992) and later analyzed in Katz et al. (1999), Autor et al. (2008),
and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The dataset I use is the Longitudinal Employer
and Household Dynamics dataset (LEHD), augmented by the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD) and the American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census
Bureau. This dataset covers the universe of U.S. private sector jobs and hence
provides us an unbiased view of the economy with a large enough sample size even
if we zoom into a narrowly defined sector. I construct composition-adjusted relative
wages and relative quantities of skilled to unskilled workers. Assuming the two skill
groups are imperfect substitutes, a shift in the demand curve for skills can be inferred
from the relative price and quantity series. I find that in the high-tech sector, the
growth in the demand for skills slowed down significantly post-2000. The timing
coincides with the decline in young firm activity shares in the high-tech sector.
The unique marriage between worker and firm characteristics in LEHD allows
me to study not only aggregate demand for skills, but also underlying patterns of
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firms’ skilled labor accumulation. I document how the ratio of the stock of skilled
labor to that of unskilled labor changes as firms age in the high-tech sector. I
show that firms accumulate skill rapidly when they are young, but the pace of
accumulation slows as firms age. I also find that the shape of this life cycle pattern
has changed over time. Compared to firms that entered the economy before 2000,
firms that were born after 2000 accumulate skilled labor more slowly and tend to
have a lower stock of skilled labor when they mature. We refer to this below as a
flattening of the life cycle pattern.
The empirical findings motivate me to develop a firm dynamics model with
skilled labor accumulation to study the joint evolution of young firm employment
shares and demand for skills. This model builds on the endogenous technological
change literature and in particular the framework developed by Klette and Kortum
(2004), as it delivers a general equilibrium model of technological change while
capturing firm entry and exit, and hence is well suited for the analysis of firm
dynamics and productivity growth. My model is closely related to the model of
Acemoglu et al. (2018), which considers differences between skilled and unskilled
labor. I extend those models by introducing adjustment costs to firms when changing
their stock of skilled labor. This feature is key to generating a life cycle pattern in
the model as we observe in the micro data.
In my model, firms hire skilled labor to perform R&D. A successful innovation
provides a technological advantage that enables a firm to take over a competitor’s
product line. Adjusting the current stock of skilled labor is costly due to the presence
of adjustment costs, and this implies that a firm’s stock of skilled labor increases
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as it ages. After a successful innovation, a firm’s markup depends on its stock of
skilled labor. This assumption captures the fact that it takes time for a young firm
to establish a customer base and gain market share. I prove that under general
conditions there exists a solution to the model in which a firm’s stock of skilled
labor per product line increases over firm age and converges to a unique long-run
level.
I calibrate the model to be consistent with key features of the high-tech sec-
tor for the 1990-2000 period and study how factors that depress young firms’ em-
ployment share could also affect demand for skills and productivity growth in the
high-tech sector. I find that rising frictions in skilled labor adjustment, which raise
the marginal cost of hiring skilled labor for all firms, lead to a decline in aggre-
gate demand for skills. Such frictions hurt young firms disproportionately, as young
firms have a higher incentive to adjust the stock of their skilled labor. Young firm
employment shares also decline as a result. Long-term growth is hampered in this
cases, as a lower stock of human capital (skill) leads to less innovation and hence
lower productivity growth. An increase in skilled labor adjustment costs that is
sufficient to generate the decline in the young firm employment share observed in
the data post-2000 leads to a reduction in the long-term productivity growth of 75
basis points.
Rising costs of entry, on the other hand, reduce the entry rate and young firm
employment share, but do not necessarily lead to lower productivity growth. This
is because incumbents’ probability of survival increases when they face less threat
from entrants. An increase in the expected firm value due to higher survival rates
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incentivizes incumbents to hire more skilled labor, and aggregate demand for skills
increases. In equilibrium, incumbents have a higher stock of skilled labor, and that
leads to an increase in productivity growth. The quantitative impact of reallocation
from young to old firms on productivity growth is therefore ambiguous in this case,
depending on the relative strength of the two competing forces in equilibrium: the
loss from the relative innovation capacity of young vs. old firms, and the gain from
an increase in the expected future value of old firms.
In sum, the quantitative study suggests that rising entry costs are unlikely
to be driving the decline in young firms’ employment shares, as they should be
associated with a rising demand for skills. Rising frictions in hiring skilled labor
reconcile both patterns, and are concerning as they imply lower long-term growth.
This chapter is connected to several strands of literature. First, it contributes
to the literature that studies declining business dynamism, its drivers and implica-
tions. Many papers have documented declining entrepreneurship and young firm
activities along with declining labor market fluidity in the United States (Davis
et al. (2012), Hyatt and Spletzer (2013), Decker et al. (2014a), Decker et al. (2014b),
Davis and Haltiwanger (2014), Decker et al. (2018), Molloy et al. (2016), etc.). This
chapter complements these empirical studies by documenting a companion feature
- declining growth in demand for skills - in the high-tech sector.
Existing studies that develop theoretical frameworks to understand the causes
of declining business dynamism cannot also explain this new fact about declining
growth in demand for skills. The labor supply story of slower population growth
(Hopenhayn et al. (2018) and Karahan et al. (2019)) cannot explain why the share
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of skilled labor in firms has declined relative to unskilled labor.3 The skill-based
technological progress argument from Salgado (2019) is also unable to reconcile this
empirical fact. Salgado (2019) focuses on the entire economy, but if his mechanism
- entrepreneurship declines in response to a rising skill premium - holds broadly, we
should expect to observe an increase (or at least a slower decline) in the share of
young firms in the high-tech sector post-2000, as data suggest that the growth rate
of the skill premium fell during that period.
This chapter instead highlights the role of frictions. Davis and Haltiwanger
(2014) argue that rising regulations such as occupational licensing or employment
protection decrease labor market fluidity and may hurt startups and young firms
more. Decker et al. (2018) document weaker marginal responsiveness of businesses
to productivity shocks and rising within-industry dispersion of TFP and output per
worker in the post-2000 period, consistent with an increase in adjustment frictions.
Akcigit and Ates (2019) highlight the decline in knowledge diffusion from frontier
firms to laggard firms as the dominant driver underlying declining business dy-
namism. My work complements this line of literature by highlighting that frictions
in adjusting skilled labor could lead to the decline in both young firm activities and
demand for skills as observed in the data.
Second, this chapter connects to the literature that studies firm dynamics and
productivity. The seminal work of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) shows that an
increase in frictions on labor adjustment reduces productivity as it reduces allocative
3The argument from Hopenhayn et al. (2018) that the non-production to production worker
ratio declined as a result of the aging firm distribution could potentially shed light on the decline
in the share of skilled labor, if we assume that non-production workers are mostly skilled labor.
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efficiency of factor inputs. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) also study the impact of allocative efficiency on aggregate productivity. The
influential work by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) quantifies the role of allocative effi-
ciency for aggregate productivity using firm-level data. They show that distortions
that drive wedges between the marginal products of labor and capital across firms
will lower aggregate TFP. While they emphasize the role of allocation of factor in-
puts, I focus on the role of the stock of factor inputs. Moreover, they focus on the
level of productivity, while I instead study the growth of productivity through an
endogenous growth model.
Third, this chapter connects to the endogenous growth literature. The inspi-
ration to look at the impact of the stock of human capital on growth comes from
the seminal work of Romer (1990), in which the stock of human capital determines
the rate of growth. Romer (1990) builds on a Solow-type model with technologi-
cal change where human capital affects growth through the nonrivalry property of
ideas. I instead model human capital as a direct input to R&D in a firm dynam-
ics model. This model is closely related to the endogenous growth firm dynamics
literature (Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Klette and
Kortum (2004)) and in particular builds upon Acemoglu et al. (2018). The difference
between my model and this line of literature is twofold. First, my model focuses
on the age dimension of firms, and in particular is the first to match micro-level
life cycle patterns of firms’ human capital accumulation. Second, Acemoglu et al.
(2018) explore the positive impact on growth from the reallocation of skill from old
to young firms, which are assumed to be more innovative. My model, on the other
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hand, suggests that such a gain from reallocation is not always guaranteed, since in
equilibrium reallocation of skilled labor from old to young firms increases the de-
struction rate, which lowers the expected value of firms. With lower expected future
value, firms hire less skilled labor, which leads to lower growth. In other words, I
consider how structural changes affect the stock of human capital, how this affects
growth, and how this channel offsets the composition effects from reallocation.
Finally, this chapter connects to the literature that studies the evolution of
aggregate demand for skills. Autor and Price (2013), Beaudry et al. (2016) and
Valletta (2018) document a reversal in the demand for skill and cognitive tasks in
the post-2000 period for the U.S. economy. While these studies look at the overall
U.S. economy and the labor market impacts of the decline in demand for skills, I
focus on the high-tech sector and study the impact of declining demand for skills on
the slowdown in productivity growth. I also study a potential cause of this decline
in skill demand: a rise in skilled labor adjustment costs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the
aggregate demand for skills in the high-tech sector and the underlying firms’ life
cycle of skilled labor accumulation. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents
the quantitative results and the last section concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I document changes over time in the demand for skills and life
cycle patterns of skilled labor accumulation for high-tech firms in the United States.
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2.2.1 Data
The main dataset used for the analysis is the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamic (LEHD) dataset from the U.S. Census Bureau. LEHD is a matched
employer-employee dataset that covers 95% of U.S. private sector jobs.4 I use the
2014 snapshot of the data, which covers information from 1990 to 2014. LEHD
tracks individual earnings at a quarterly frequency and provides information on
worker demographics (e.g. age, gender, education). The unique combination of
worker and firm characteristics in LEHD allows me to analyze firm-level behavior
regarding skilled labor accumulation and demand for skills.
I augment LEHD with the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). LBD is a
census of business establishments and firms with paid employees in the U.S. and is
comprised of survey and administrative records. The LBD tracks business activity
information on an annual basis. Data include industry, location, employment, an-
nual payroll, birth, death and ownership changes (if any) at the establishment level.5
In my analysis, an accurate measure of firm age is important. The fact that LBD
provides information on establishments whose identifiers are longitudinally stable as
opposed to firm identifiers that can change over time due to ownership, single/multi-
unit status or other changes, allows me to have a more robust measure of firm age
than the direct usage of firm identifiers from the LEHD, and this is crucial for my
analysis. The highest level of business unit ID in the LEHD is the federal EIN. To
merge LBD to LEHD, I integrate the federal EIN from the Business Register with
4Detailed discussion of LEHD data can be found in Abowd et al. (2009).
5Jarmin and Miranda (2002) provides a detailed description of the data.
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the LBD and use the crosswalk developed by Haltiwanger et al. (2014c).
Finally, I augment the merged LEHD-LBD data with the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS). The education variable in LEHD is heavily imputed, with
about 92% of individuals having imputed education (Vilhuber et al. (2018)). To
get a sample with a better measure of education, I integrate the demographic in-
formation from ACS with the LEHD. After the merge, I keep only the subsample
with non-imputed education, which is around 25% of the full sample. As the non-
imputed subsample consists of households also appearing in the Decennial Census
or ACS, which are random samples of the households in the United States, the 25%
non-imputed sample I focus on is representative of the underlying overall sample.
The focus of this chapter is on the high-tech sector. I use the methodology
developed by Heckler (2005) and define the high-tech sector as a group of industries
with very high shares of workers in the STEM occupations of science, technology,
engineering, and math. This sector includes 14 four-digit NAICS industries and
covers ICT and biotechnology industries.6 A list of high-tech industries is provided
in Appendix A.1.
The final dataset consists of over 600, 000 firms and over 2 million workers in
the high-tech sector from 1990 to 2014.
2.2.2 Demand for Skills in the High-Tech Sector
I measure demand for skills following the canonical methodology developed
by Katz and Murphy (1992) and further analyzed by Katz et al. (1999), Autor
6Similar definitions have been adopted in Haltiwanger et al. (2014b), and Decker et al. (2018).
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et al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The canonical model provides a
parsimonious framework for thinking about the skill premium. The key assumption
underlying the canonical model is that skilled and unskilled labor are separate inputs
for production and are imperfect substitutes. Any force mimicking skilled-biased
technological progress can lead to a shift in the demand curve for skills, and the
shift can be derived based on how the price and quantity of skilled labor change
relative to unskilled labor. In such models, skilled workers are defined as those
with college and above education and unskilled workers as those with high school
equivalent education.7 I follow the same definition as the literature.
To calculate demand for skills from the canonical framework, the key is to
compute the underlying series for composition-adjusted relative wages and relative
quantities between skilled and unskilled workers. The demand for skills can be
computed as a linear combination of the relative wage and quantity series given the
elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labor.8 In the LEHD, I define
the wage for a particular worker in year t as the average full quarter earnings for
that worker in year t and labor supply as the total number of quarters worked in
that year. I classify workers into 64 demographic cells by gender (x2), education
(x4) and experience (x8), and compute the average wage and total labor supply
for each cell in each year. The average wage for each cell is a weighted average of
individuals’ quarterly wages where the weights are annual quarters worked. I use
7Workers with some college education are spitted into high and low-skill categories evenly.
8In particular, I follow Autor et al. (2008) and calculate demand for skills based on the op-
timality condition ln(wHt /w
L
t ) = (1/σ)[Dt − ln(NHt /NLt )]. wH and wL are wages for high and
low skilled labor respectively and NH and NL are corresponding quantities (supply). Dt indexes
relative demand shifts favoring high skilled labor. σ represents the elasticity of substitution.
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fixed weights for each cell to compute the time series of aggregate wages, where the
fixed weight for each cell is its average share of labor supply over all years (1990
to 2014). Using fixed weights to aggregate wages across groups has the benefit of
keeping the composition of the labor force fixed so that the results are not driven
by changes in composition.
I aggregate the sample in every year into 4 cells by education level (college
and above, some college, high school and below high school). The relative wage is
the wage ratio of college and above workers to high school workers. The relative
quantity is the labor supply ratio of college equivalent to high school equivalent
workers in efficiency units (where efficiency units of labor supply is defined as the
total hours multiplied by the average wage for that cell over the entire sample). The
college equivalent labor supply is defined as the sum of labor supply from college and
above workers plus half of the supply from some college workers. The high school
equivalent supply is the sum of labor supply from high school educated workers,
supply from below high school workers and half of the supply from some college
workers.9
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of demand for skills in the high-tech sector
between 1990 and 2014. The demand for skills was on a steep upward trend from
1990 until 2000, after which the growth in skill demand slowed down significantly.
This finding on the high-tech sector resonates with the work of Beaudry et al. (2016)
and Valletta (2018), who find a flattening of the wage premium and a reversal of
9Note that in the calculation above, effectively, I omit some college and below high school
workers from relative wages but include them in relative quantity.
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Figure 2.1: Demand for skills by firm age groups in the high-tech sector. The blue
solid line shows the demand for skills for the high-tech sector as a whole. The red
dashed line shows the demand for skills for young firms (less than 5 years old) and
the yellow dash-dot line shows the same measure for old firms. The levels at 1990
are normalized to 1 and the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled
labor is assumed to be 1.62.
the demand for skills and cognitive tasks for the U.S. economy as a whole. Figure
2.1 also breaks down the overall sector demand into the demands of young and old
firms, respectively. While the series for old firms tracks the sectoral trend closely,
the demand for skills from young firms dropped significantly. Note that the choice of
elasticity of substitution is innocuous here. The figure shows the measures assuming
an elasticity of 1.62, following Autor et al. (2008), but the significant flattening
pattern is robust to elasticities of substitution in the commonly used range of 1 to
3.
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The significant slow down of the growth of demand for skills shown in Figure
2.1 is striking as it suggests that some fundamental change regarding skill demand
may have occurred in the high-tech sector post-2000. Given the highly innovative
nature of this sector and the importance of human capital to innovation and growth,
changes in demand for skills may reflect changes in the underlying innovation process
that influence productivity growth.
I further examine the relative price and relative quantity components under-
lying the estimated demand for skills. Panel (A) of Figure 2.2 shows that the skill
intensity in young firms has been declining since 2000. This decline in the relative
quantity of skilled labor was accompanied by a decline in the relative price of skill
in young firms, indicating a drop in skill demand from young firms. Panel (B) of
Figure 2.2 shows the same series for old firms. We can see that the skill premium
flattened post-2000, reflecting anemic demand for skills.
The definition of skill deserves some discussion. The fundamental measure of
the skill of an individual is the amount of human capital they possess. Education
has long been used as a proxy for human capital, although some studies have chal-
lenged this idea by noting the differences between education and occupation (job
task).10 That line of research argues that human capital is only relevant to the
extent it is required by the task a worker is performing. This line of thinking is par-
ticularly helpful in analyzing labor market dynamics such as the interaction between
technology, offshoring and the structure of wages. However, the difference between
education and occupation is arguably less of a concern when we focus on a narrowly
10These studies include Autor et al. (2010) and David and Dorn (2013).
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(A) Young Firms (B) Old Firms
Figure 2.2: Relative quantity and relative wage. Panel (A) shows the evolution
of the relative quantity (solid line, LHS) and relative wage (dashed line, RHS) of
skilled to unskilled labor in young firms (less than 5 years old). Panel (B) shows the
evolution of the relative quantity (solid line, LHS) and relative wage (dashed line,
RHS) of skilled to unskilled labor in old firms. The levels in 1990 are normalized to
1.
defined sector in which the relationship between education and tasks is more stable.
Moreover, the time span I am focusing on is much shorter compared to the literature
emphasizing the importance of tasks. Nonetheless, I provide an occupation (task)
based demand for skills measure in Appendix A.2 using publicly available data, and
the results are consistent with my baseline results using education to proxy for skills.
The sector-level patterns inspire us to dive deeper into individual firms’ skill
accumulation and how it has changed over time. The next section discusses the
details.
2.2.3 Life Cycle of Skill Accumulation among High-Tech Firms
The unique combination of firm and worker information in the LEHD allows me
to track how firms accumulate skill over time. Before looking into skill accumulation
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over the firm’s life cycle, it is useful to think again about the measurement of skill.
The literature on skill demand following Katz and Murphy (1992) emphasizes
that in order to track aggregate relative quantities and prices for skilled and un-
skilled labor, one must adjust for changes in the composition of the pool of workers
so that the measured quantity of skill is comparable over time. The same intuition
holds when we want to track the quantity of skill a firm possesses over time. To
make such a composition adjustment, I convert the number of workers to the equiv-
alent “efficiency units” by multiplying the quantity of workers in a given cell by a
conversion coefficient that is specific to that cell. Cells are defined based on gender,
age, education and experience. The conversion factor is defined in the same way as
in Autor et al. (2008), as the average relative wage in that group over the entire
period from 1990 to 2014.
The life cycle pattern of skill accumulation is calculated as a firm’s skill inten-
sity (efficiency units of high-skilled labor divided by efficiency units of low-skilled
labor) of that firm at age a relative to age 0.
Figure 2.3 shows the life cycle pattern of skill intensity of high-tech firms. We
observe that high-tech firms accumulate skills rapidly when they are young (less
than 5 years old) and that the speed of accumulation then slows down. Firms have
a relatively stable skill intensity when they mature.
I further examine how this life cycle pattern has changed over time. To do
so, I first split sample firms into cohorts defined by year of entry, and separately
plot the life cycles of skilled and unskilled labor relative to age 0 for those cohorts.
Figure 2.4 shows the results. Panel (A) of figure 2.4 shows the life cycle of the
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Figure 2.3: The figure plots the average life cycle of skill accumulation for sample
high-tech firms. Specifically, the ratio of high skilled labor in efficiency units to low
skilled labor in efficiency units at age a relative to age 0. Firms do not need to
survive for 15 years in order to be included.
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(A) Skilled Labor (B) Unskilled Labor
Figure 2.4: Life cycle of skill for different cohorts Panel A shows skilled labor relative
to age 0 for cohorts entering the economy at different times. Blue indicates cohorts
entering before 2000 and red indicates cohorts entering after 2000. Panel B shows
unskilled labor relative to age 0 for cohorts entering the economy at different times.
Blue indicates cohorts entering before 2000 and red indicates cohorts entering after
2000.
amount of high-skilled labor relative to age 0 for different cohorts as they age.
The difference between cohorts entering into the economy before and after 2000 is
significant. Cohorts entering before 2000 almost double their level of skilled labor
by age 5, but cohorts entering after 2000 increase their skilled labor by less than 50
percent by age 5. On the other hand, the differences between the life cycle patterns
of unskilled labor accumulation are less significant for cohorts entering before and
after 2000, as shown in Panel (B) of figure 2.4.
Finally, I run a fixed effects regression to estimate the life cycle pattern of skill,
controlling for firm and time fixed effects. Specifically, I run the following regression:
∆ lnES,Ui,a,t = αi + βt + γa + εa,i,t (2.1)
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(A) Skilled Labor (B) Unskilled Labor
Figure 2.5: Fixed effects estimates. Panel (A) shows the fixed effects estimates of
the life cycle pattern of skilled labor accumulation for periods before and after 2000
respectively. Panel (B) shows the fixed effects estimates of the life cycle pattern of
unskilled labor accumulation for periods before and after 2000 respectively. Error
bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.
for the periods before and after 2000, respectively. ES,Ui,a,t are the efficiency units of
skilled or unskilled labor for firm i with age a at time t. αi, βt, and γa are firm,
time and age fixed effects. ∆ is the change relative to age 0.
Figure 2.5 plots the estimates of γa in equation 2.1, along with 90% confidence
intervals. Panel (A) suggests that firms accumulate skilled labor much more rapidly
before 2000 than in the later period. The confidence intervals of the two estimates do
not overlap, suggesting that differences between life cycle patterns before and after
2000 are statistically significant. Panel (B) plots the life cycle patterns for unskilled
labor. There is also a significant flattening of the life cycle patterns for unskilled
labor, but the gap is much smaller than that of unskilled labor. Taking Panels (A)
and (B) together, we can see that the skilled labor accumulation in high-tech firms
slowed down considerably post-2000.
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2.3 The Model
In this section, I introduce the theoretical framework and characterize the
stationary balanced growth equilibrium.
2.3.1 Final Good Production
The economy has a representative firm that combines intermediate inputs to





where yjt is the input of intermediate good j at time t, and Ωt ∈ [0, 1] is the set of
active product lines at time t. Mt is the measure of Ωt and can be smaller than 1.
The reason why there can be inactive product lines will be made clear later. The
final good is used for consumption.
For each intermediate good j, the final good producer can choose from Nj





where xkjt is the amount of version k of intermediate good j at time t. Following the
standard assumption in the literature (Grossman and Helpman (1991)), I assume
that different versions are perfectly substitutable, which implies that the final good
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producer will use the version with the lowest price.





which further implies that






We choose the final good as the numeraire, i.e. Pt = 1.
2.3.2 Intermediate Good Production
Intermediate good (product) j is produced by the monopolist who has the
leading-ledge technology in that product line. A firm can own multiple product lines
and produce multiple intermediate goods simultaneously. Firms in the intermediate
goods sector hire both skilled and unskilled labor. I assume that after paying a fixed





where lujt is the number of unskilled workers employed for producing this good, and
Ajt is the leading-edge technology of firm f on this product line j. The marginal
cost of production is therefore wut /Ajt.
I assume that the firm producing version k of intermediate good j has produc-
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tivity Akjt and engages in Bertrand monopolistic competition as often assumed in
the endogenous technical change literature, where the firm with the lowest marginal
cost wins the whole market and sets its price equal to the marginal cost of its closest
follower.11 Assume the productivity of the leading edge firm for good j is Ajt =
maxk A
k
jt at time t, with that of the closest follower being Âjt = maxl,Akjt 6=Ajt A
k
jt.





2.3.3 Firm Heterogeneity and the Innovation Process
Firms in the intermediate goods sector engage in both product and process
innovation. Product innovations enable firms to acquire new products, and process
innovations can further affect the technology advantage of a firm compared to its
closest competitors.
Firms improve product quality through process innovation. Denote the quality
advantage of the leading edge firm Ajt/Âjt by qjt, with qjt > 1. I assume that qjt is





1− η0 × (lsjt)η1
, (2.8)
where η0, η1 ∈ [0, 1]. ls is skilled labor net of the fixed cost lf . Intuitively, if firm
11Grossman and Helpman (1991),Lentz and Mortensen (2008),Ates and Saffie (2016), among
others.
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has no skilled labor, i.e. lsjt = 0, it cannot enjoy a technology edge over its nearest
competitor. The size of the quality advantage is an increasing function of skilled
labor devoted to that product line.
The introduction of η1 deserves some discussion. I assume this specific form
so that the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be ensured through certain regularity
conditions.
I model product innovations following Klette and Kortum (2004), so that
the number of product lines of a firm of age a, na,t, changes through a creative-
destruction process. The likelihood of success is heterogeneous across firms, de-
pending on the amount of skilled labor per product line of a firm, and the number
of product lines owned by the firm. The latter can be considered as a proxy of the
knowledge capital of that firm.
Product innovations are undirected. A firm that owns na,t product lines re-
ceives na,t iid innovation shocks. Each shock follows a Bernoulli distribution with
the success probability λ(lsa,t), in which λ(·) is an increasing and concave function,




θ with θ < 1.
Denote the equilibrium destruction rate in the economy as µt. Conditional
on the survival of a firm (with respect to exogenous destruction, which will be
introduced shortly), a product line with skilled labor lsa,t faces the following three
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possible outcomes next period:
The number of product lines =

2 with probability λ(lsa,t)(1− µt)
1 with probability (1− λ(lsa,t))(1− µt) + λ(lsa,t)µt
0 with probability (1− λ(lsa,t))µt
.
The expected number of product lines for the firm is therefore
E[na+1,t+1] = [1 + λ(l
s
a,t)− µt]×Na,t. (2.9)
Firms need to pay adjustment costs when adjusting their skilled labor. I
assume that the amount of skilled labor is the same across product lines owned by

















where δ is an exogenously given separation rate of skilled labor, and ϕ determines the
difficulty of adjusting skilled labor. I can alternatively assume the adjustment cost
is on the total skilled labor at the firm, but as I will show later, defining adjustment
costs based on the number of skilled workers per product line will help simplify the
optimization problems of firms.
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Figure 2.6: The timeline of the model.
2.3.4 Optimal Decisions of Intermediate Goods Producers
The timeline of the model is illustrated by figure 2.6. I solve the optimization
problem of intermediate goods producers in two steps. In the first step, I solve for
the optimal amount of unskilled labor as a function of the amount of skilled labor
per product line. In the second step, I solve the optimal choice of the amount of
skilled labor per product line.
Consider a product line j owned by a firm of age a. Given the amount of
skilled labor per product line lsa,t, the firm chooses unskilled labor of the product




pjtyjt − wut lujt
)
(2.11)

































which is only a function of lsa,t, and which henceforth is denoted as Bt(l
s
a,t).
2.3.5 Entry and Exit
I assume that firms’ entry decisions follow Acemoglu et al. (2017). A new firm
chooses to hire ls0 units of skilled labor and needs to pay a fixed cost to enter into the
economy. After paying the fixed cost, the entrant will have access to the innovation
technology λE(·). A successful innovation enables an entrant to own one product
line at the beginning of the next period.
I assume that the fixed cost is equal to ξ units of skilled labor, and that the
remaining ls0 − ξ units of skilled labor are involved in the innovation process. The











where λE(l) = λE0 l
θ.
The number of entrants adjusts so that the implied destruction rate µ ensures
that the free entry condition holds.
The firm faces an exogenous destruction rate of ν. Firms exit the economy
when their number of product lines decreases to zero or when they are hit by the
exogenous destruction shock.
2.3.6 Value Functions
Now I turn to the second step. Adjustment costs of skilled labor imply that
the amount of skilled labor per product line is a state variable. Firms choose the


















The form of adjustment costs implies that the value function is linear in the number
of product lines na,t. Define vt(l
s
a−1,t−1) = Vt(na,t, l
s
a−1,t−1)/na,t.
























Proof : It is straightforward to prove the linearity of V in n using guess and verify.
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2.3.7 Household








where Ct is the consumption of the final good at time t. χ > 1 and
1
χ−1 denotes
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. As will be defined later, At is the aggregate
productivity, where At = Yt/L
u
t . Note that At changes endogenously in response
to innovation. I choose this endogenous scaling by following Ates and Saffie (2016)
who justify this assumption through home production. This assumption is useful
for simplifying the analysis of the balanced growth path later.
The representative household owns Lu units of unskilled labor, which is con-
stant over time, and supplies Lst units of skilled labor, which will be supplied elas-
tically based on the skilled labor wage wst .




s + wut L
u + Πt,



















where i denotes the firm that owns product line j in period t, and lsi,t denotes the
average amount of skilled labor owned by firm i in period t.





















The first order condition of the household optimization problem implies that





2.3.8 Aggregate Growth Dynamics
As the final good is the numeraire,


















ln Ãjtdj − ln(Mt). (2.20)
As an individual product line’s unskilled labor is given by equation (2.12), I
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Since the amount of skilled labor per product line is the only state variable, it
is the same across all firms entering within the same cohort, and therefore is always
the same for all firms within the same cohort over time. This implies that lsa,t and
lua,t are functions solely of age in period t.
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Denote the measure of product lines owned by firms of age a at the beginning
of period t as Λa,t, and the measure of entrants in period t as Λ0,t.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as prices {{pjt}j∈Ωt , wst , wut } and choices
{Yt, {yDjt}j∈Ωt , {ySj,t}j∈Ωt , {lsa,t}a=0,1,...}, {lua,t}a=1,...}, Ct, Lst}, profit Πt, destruction
rate µt, and the distribution of products across age cohorts {Λa,t}a=0,1,..., such that
1. {Ct, Lst} solve the decision problem of households (2.17) taking wst , wut and Πt
as given, in which Πt satisfies equation (2.18).
2. Yt and {yDjt} solve the representative final goods producer’s problem (A.1),
taking {pjt}j∈Ωt as given.
3. {ySjt, lua,t} solve the intermediate goods producer of age a’s problem (2.12),
taking Yt, pj,t, and l
s
a,t as given, if the product line j belongs to the cohort
aged a in period t.
4. {lsa,t}a=0,1,... solve the Bellman equation (2.16), taking wst and µt as given.







= 0 is satisfied,
in which vt satisfies the Bellman equation (2.16).
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where Lst satisfies equation (2.19).
7. The distribution of products across age cohorts evolves in an internally con-
sistent way:
Λ1,t+1 = Λ0,tλ
E(ls0,t − ξ) (2.27)
Λa+1,t+1 = Λa,t ×
(
1 + λ(lsa,t)− µt
)
(1− ν) (2.28)
8. The equilibrium destruction rate µt satisfies:
µt = λ(l
s




where Mt is the share of product lines alive at the beginning of period t, and
this equation holds because I assume that innovation is undirected.
To simplify the analysis, I add an assumption that due to technological spillovers,











In this chapter, I study the balanced growth path or the steady state of the
equilibrium.
Denote X̃ = Xt/At for a variable X that is growing at the same rate as At,
and X = Xt for a variable that is a constant at the steady state. In particular At:
Ỹ = Yt/At, w̃
s = wst/At, w̃









s = Lst , Λa =
Λa,t,and Mt = M , in which a ∈ {0, 1, ...,+∞}.
LEMMA 2: Along the balanced growth path,
M =
µ
1− (1− µ)(1− ν)
. (2.30)
Proof: See Appendix A.6.
























































Λa+1 = Λa × (1− ν)
(
1 + λ(lsa)− µ
)



























2.3.10 The Optimal Choices of Skilled Labor
I solve the steady state equilibrium in three steps. In the first step, I solve
the optimal decisions {lsa, ṽ(lsa)} as functions of {w̃s, w̃u, µ}. In the second step, I
determine µ based on the entry condition. Finally, I use market clearing conditions
to solve for equilibrium prices w̃s and w̃u. In this section, I discuss the first step and
present conditions under which there exists a unique solution to the skilled labor
life cycle accumulation problem.
I conjecture that the number of skilled workers per product line will asymp-
totically approach a constant level l̄ as firm age rises, where l̄ satisfies conditions
(2.31) (2.32), which are derived by letting l̄ = lsa = l
s
a+1 and solving the Bellman













r + µ− λ(l̄)
1 + r
vs(l̄) = B̃s(l̄)− w̃sl̄ − ϕ
2
w̃sl̄δ2, (2.32)
where B̃s(l̄) = Luη0l̄
η1 , and dB̃s(l̄)/dl̄ = η1L
uη0(l̄)
η1−1.



















Note that the upper bound for l̄, l̄max, is given by






The intuition for l̄max is as follows: the maximum innovation rate of firms should not
exceed r+µ. With the assumption that the maximum innovation rate of firms does
not exceed µ, the higher the innovative capacity of a firm, the fewer skilled workers
there should be, to avoid violating the condition that the maximum innovation rate
should be smaller than r + µ.
The existence and uniqueness of l̄ in the economy are guaranteed under the
conditions outlined in Proposition 1, the proof of which can be found in appendix
(A.5).
Proposition 1: The existence and uniqueness of l̄. Under the following
conditions, there is a unique solution of l̄:
η1 < θ (2.34)













(1− η1)(1− θ)(1 + r)
(1 + θ − η1)(r + µ)
(2.37)
Proof: See appendix A.5.
In the quantitative analysis below, I will restrict parameters such that these




The calibration strategy consists of two parts. I determine the values of stan-
dard parameters outside of the model, based on the standard practice in the litera-
ture. Second, I calibrate other parameters internally such that the balanced growth
path of the model matches several features of the high-tech sector between 1990 and
2000.
I choose the elasticity of successful innovation with respect to R&D as 0.5,
following Acemoglu et al. (2018). The interest rate is set to 0.02, similar to those
used by Acemoglu et al. (2018) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018). The Frisch elasticity χ
is set to be 1.455, following Mendoza (1991) and also standard in the literature. The
depreciation rate of human capital captures not only depreciation of the knowledge
stock of a firm, but also the separation of skilled workers from firms. I select its
value to be 0.1, the same as a typical choice in the literature for the depreciation
rate of capital. The results are not sensitive to a smaller value of this depreciation
rate. Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters calibrated outside of the model.
Other parameters are determined inside the model by matching model out-
comes with their data counterparts. For the purpose of our analysis, it is key to
match the moments governing skilled labor, including the life cycle of skilled labor
accumulation, the payroll share of skilled relative to unskilled labor, and the dis-
tribution of skilled labor among different firm age groups. I design the calibration
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Parameter Symbol Value Sources/Data Targets
Parameters from Other Studies
Innovation elasticity θ 0.50 Acemoglu et al. (2018)
Discount rate r 0.02 Acemoglu et al. (2018), Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
Frisch elasticity χ 1.455 Standard
Depreciation of human capital δ 0.1 Standard
Table 2.1: Parameters Determined Outside the Model
strategy to make sure my model matches those key features of the data.
I determine process innovation capacity parameters η0 and η1 by matching
the average payroll share of skilled relative to unskilled labor and the young firm
employment share in skilled labor in the LEHD from 1990 to 2000. These two data
targets are sensitive to process innovation, because process innovation affects the
skill accumulation over firm age through the marginal return of hiring an additional
skilled worker. I define the young firm employment share, in both the model outcome
and the data counterpart as the employed share of skilled workers for firms aged 0
to 4. The results are not sensitive to using all workers rather than skilled workers.
The adjustment cost intensity parameter ϕ is chosen to match the life cycle
growth of skilled labor in the LEHD for 1990-2000. The life cycle growth of skill, as
explained earlier, is defined as the efficiency units of skilled labor at age a relative
to that at age 0. I look at the growth from age 0 to age 5 for an average high-tech
firm between 1990 and 2000, which in the data is taken from the coefficient of the
fixed effects regression in equation (2.1).
The entrant and incumbent innovation capacity λE and λ0, the fixed operation
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Parameter Value
A. Data target: payroll share of skilled relative to unskilled workers
and young firm employment share of skilled labor
Scaling of quality improvement η0 0.31
Payroll sensitivity to skilled labor η1 0.30
B. Data target: life cycle of skilled labor
Skilled labor adjustment cost ϕ 1
C. Data targets: distribution of skilled labor across firm age, entry, and exit rates
Incumbent innovation intensity λ0 0.01
Entrant innovation intensity λE 0.0074
Fixed cost lf 1.45
Entry cost ξ 0.45
Exogenous destruction rate ν 0.005
Table 2.2: Parameters Determined Inside the Model
costs lf , the fixed cost of entry ξ, and exogenous destruction rate ν are jointly chosen
by matching the skilled labor distribution across firm age groups and firm exit rates
computed from the LEHD for 1990-2000.
Table 2.2 summarizes the value of parameters and Table 2.3 shows the model
performance.
2.4.2 Quantitative Results
To highlight the importance of skilled labor adjustment frictions for long-term
productivity growth, I compare the growth impact of two exogenous changes in
model parameters. The first is an increase in the adjustment cost of changing the
stock of skilled labor of a firm, and the second is a decline in the entrant innovation
capacity. The former represents frictions that affect all incumbent firms and the
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Data Target Data Model
A. Data target: payroll share of skilled relative to unskilled workers and young employment share
The ratio of non-production to production worker compensation 2.9 2.9
Share of skilled labor in firms aged 0-4 9.6% 9.8%
B. Data target: life-cycle of skilled labor
Age 5 to Age 0 ratio of skill intensity 5.5 5.5
C. Data targets: distribution of skilled labor across firm age, entry, and exit rates (LEHD 90-14)
Share of skilled labor in firms aged 5-7 5.4% 7.2%
Share of skilled labor in firms aged 8-10 5.4% 6.7%
Share of skilled labor in firms aged 11-15 8.9% 9.9%
Exit rate (small/young) 9.9% 6.5%
Exit rate (small/old) 8.8% 6.4%
Table 2.3: Data Targets and Model Counterparts
latter is a way to capture frictions facing entrants only. I will show how the young
firm employment share, the life cycle of skilled labor accumulation, the demand for
skills, and productivity growth respond to the two different types of shocks.
I discipline the change in adjustment costs and entry innovation capacity so
that the young firm employment share decreases from 9.6% in the pre-2000 period to
6.2% by 2014 along the balanced growth path.12 I do not target changes in the life
cycle of skilled labor accumulation. To match the decline in young firm employment
shares, in the first experiment, entrant innovation capacity declines from 0.0074 to
0.0065, other things equal. In the second experiment, the skilled labor adjustment
cost parameter increases from 1 to 10 13, while keeping other parameters unchanged.
12These are the young firm employment shares in terms of the skilled labor. Young firms are
those less than 5 years old. 9.6% is the 10-year average of the share between 1990 and 2000, and
6.2% is the young firm employment share in 2014.
13The share of adjustment costs in total revenue increases from 0.05% to 5 percent
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I consider a decline in entrant innovation capacity to proxy for rising entry costs as
recent studies suggest that the innovation production function may have changed
over time (Bloom et al. (2017), Fernald and Jones (2014)). The results are broadly
consistent if I instead study rising fixed costs of entry.
I show that rising frictions in skilled labor adjustment can generate declines
in the young firm employment share and the demand for skills, consistent with the
data, while declining entry costs cannot generate a decline in the demand for skills.
I further show that a rise in skilled labor adjustment costs sufficient to generate a
decline in the young firm employment share consistent with the data would imply
a 75 basis point decrease in the productivity growth rate in the high-tech sector.
2.4.2.1 Skilled Labor Distribution by Firm Age
The skilled employment distribution across firm age is sensitive to both entrant
innovation capacity and skilled labor adjustment costs. Figure 2.7 shows that a
decline in young firm innovation capacity reduces the skilled employment shares of
firms aged between 0-4, 5-7, 8-10 and 10-15. Similarly, increasing adjustment costs
also shift the skilled labor distribution towards old firms.
While both lower entrant innovation capacity and higher adjustment costs shift
the distribution of skilled labor towards old firms, they operate through different
channels. Decreasing entrant innovation capacity lowers the entry rate from 2.9%
to 1.9%. This reduction in the entry rate brings down young firm employment
shares. Increasing adjustment costs, on the other hand, has limited impact on the
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of skilled labor across firm age groups under different sce-
narios. Blue bars (left) show the baseline distribution. Red bars(center) represent
the share of skilled labor owned by a particular firm age group under low entrant
innovation capacity. Yellow bars (right) represent the share of skilled labor owned
by a particular firm age group under high adjustment costs. Both lower entrant
innovation capacity and increased skilled labor adjustment costs shift the skilled
labor distribution towards old firms.
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entry margin. The entry rate decreases by only 30 basis points, to 2.6%. The main
channel through which adjustment costs affect the young firm employment share is
the intensive margin. Facing higher adjustment costs, both young and old firms hire
less skilled labor, but the reduction is more significant for young firms, as they have
a higher incentive to hire skilled labor. The difference between the implications of
lower entrant innovation capacity and higher adjustment costs can also be seen from
Figure 2.7, where the gap between the base case the low entrant innovation capacity
case is similar for firms in age groups 0-4, 5-7, 8-10 and 10-15, while this gap is
larger for firms in the younger age groups in the case of high adjustment costs.
2.4.2.2 The Life Cycle of Skilled Labor Accumulation
Declining entrant innovation capacity and rising skilled labor adjustment costs
have opposite impacts on the life cycle of skilled labor accumulation, as is shown
in Figure 2.8. Declining entrant innovation capacity induces incumbents to hire
more skilled labor. The intuition is that the marginal return of hiring an additional
skilled worker increases with the expected probability of survival, which increases
with a decline in the entrant innovation capacity. The equilibrium destruction rate
µ reduces to 6.1% from 6.8% when I lower the entrant innovation capacity.
Rising adjustment costs, meanwhile, clearly discourage firms from hiring skilled
workers. The marginal cost of hiring an additional unit of skilled labor increases
for both young and old firms. Even though the destruction rate also decreases in
this case (from 6.8% to 6.4%), the marginal benefit of hiring is not sufficiently large
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Figure 2.8: This figure plots skilled labor relative to age 0 under different scenar-
ios. The solid blue line is the baseline case. The red dashed line is the life cycle
under lower entrant innovation capacity and the yellow dash-dot line is the life cy-
cle under higher skilled labor adjustment costs. Entrant innovation capacity and
skilled labor adjustment costs have different impacts on the life cycle of skilled labor
accumulation.
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to offset the increased costs. Hence, in the equilibrium all firms hire fewer skilled
workers and the life cycle of skilled labor accumulation flattens, as shown in Figure
2.8.
One may wonder if the flattened life cycle under higher adjustment costs is
simply the result of a higher initial level of skilled labor, as entrants may choose to
increase their initial stock of skilled labor to avoid paying higher adjustment costs
later on. We show that this effect is minimal. Initial stock of the skilled labor
increases only slightly from 2.4 to 2.7, while the stock of skilled labor decreases in
much large magnitudes for incumbents of all ages (for example, the stock of skilled
labor for an age 5 firm decreases from 18.3 to 10.6).
2.4.2.3 Aggregate Demand for Skills
The aggregate demand for skills responds differently to declining entrant inno-
vation capacity and rising adjustment costs. A decline in entrant innovation capacity
leads to a strong rise in the aggregate demand for skills, as measured by the wage
ratio between high and low skilled labor, which rises from 3.0 to 3.6. The increase
in demand for skills occurs in response to the reduced equilibrium destruction rate,
which increases the survival rate and hence the expected value of incumbents. An
increase in the skilled labor adjustment costs, on the other hand, leads to a signifi-
cant decline in the aggregate demand for skills, as the wage ratio drops to 2.4 from
3.0.
I further break down the demand for skills into relative price and quantity,
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(A) Relative Price (B) Relative Quantity
(C) Relative Price (D) Relative Quantity
Figure 2.9: Relative price and quantity under different scenarios. Panel (A) shows
the high to low skilled labor wage ratio when entrant innovation capacity declines.
Panel (B) shows the ratio of aggregate high to low skilled labor when entrant inno-
vation capacity declines. Panel (C) shows the high to low skilled labor wage ratio
when skilled labor adjustment costs increase. Panel (D) shows the ratio of aggregate
high to low skilled labor when skilled labor adjustment costs increase.
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(A) Rising Adjustment Costs (B) Declining Entrant Innovation Capacity
Figure 2.10: Sources of growth. Panel (A) shows the growth from young firms (solid
line, LHS) and old firms (dashed line, RHS) under rising skilled labor adjustment
costs. Panel (B) shows the growth from young firms (solid line, LHS) and old firms
(dashed line,RHS) under decreasing entrant innovation capacity. Young firms are
those less than 5 years old.
as shown in Figure 2.9. A decline in entrant innovation capacity increases both
the relative price (wage) and the relative quantity of skilled to unskilled labor. An
increase in skilled labor adjustment costs, on the other hand, decreases both the
relative price and quantity of skilled to unskilled labor.
2.4.2.4 Implications for Productivity Growth
I now look at the implications of changes in entry costs and adjustment costs
for productivity growth under the two different scenarios. When skilled labor adjust-
ment costs increase, productivity growth decreases by 75 basis points. On the other
hand, when entrant innovation capacity declines, aggregate productivity growth
actually increases by 55 basis points. The counterintuitive productivity gain is a
result of the increased demand for skills, which increases the stock of skilled labor
for incumbent firms and hence produces a higher innovation success rate and higher
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productivity growth.
The effects can be better seen in Figure 2.10, where I decompose aggregate
productivity growth into growth from young firms (including entrants) and growth
from old firms. Panel A shows the growth components under rising adjustment
costs. We can see that when adjustment costs are higher, both young and old firms’
growth rates decline. Panel B shows the growth components under decreasing en-
trant innovation capacity. When entrant innovation capacity decreases, the growth
from entrants declines. But such a decline is offset by the increase in the growth
rate of incumbents, whose innovation success rate increases as they now face a lower
threat of destruction and hire more skilled labor.
2.4.2.5 Alternative Experiments
The analysis above considers entrant innovation capacity as a proxy for entry
costs. Alternatively, I experiment with increasing the fixed cost of entry ξ, while
fixed costs of entry which leads to broadly similar implications as declining entrant
innovation capacity. Figure 2.11 shows the results. Increasing fixed costs of entry
lowers the entry rate and decreases the young firm employment share. Meanwhile,
the lowered threat from entrants increases the probability of survival of incumbents
and their demand for skills. In equilibrium, the increase in productivity growth from
incumbents more than offsets the slower growth from entrants, similar to the effects
of lower entrant innovation capacity. The difference comes from the implications for
life cycle growth. When fixed costs of entry increase, firms need to hire a higher
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Figure 2.11: Effects of fixed costs of entry. I show how the young firm employ-
ment share, the life cycle of skilled labor accumulation, the demand for skills, and
productivity growth response to a change in the fixed cost of entry.
amount of skilled labor in order to enter which leads to slower growth of skilled
labor post-entry.
I next discuss the effects when lowering the innovation capacity for entrants
and incumbents together, while keeping the relative strength of entrant and incum-
bent innovation capacity constant. Figure 2.12 shows the results. Intuitively, de-
creasing innovation capacity will lower aggregate growth. In fact, in this case, both
the life cycle of skilled labor and the demand for skills remain largely unchanged,
while productivity growth from both entrants and incumbents declines purely as a
result of reduced innovation capacity. The young firm employment share declines
slightly in this case. Intuitively, when innovation capacity declines, both entrants
and incumbents have a lower success rate of product innovation. However, incum-
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Figure 2.12: Effects of lower innovation capacity for both entrants and incumbents.
I show how the young firm employment share, the life cycle of skilled labor accu-
mulation, the demand for skills, and productivity growth response to a change in
innovation capacity.
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bents’ advantage in process innovation now becomes higher, as they have a higher
stock of skilled labor to conduct process innovation (as reflected in the quality im-
provement/mark up function equation 2.8).
Finally, note that in my analysis, the decline in the life cycle pattern of skill ac-
cumulation under rising adjustment frictions is not as large as the post-2000 decline
from the data. If there are additional factors which further reduce firms’ demand
for skills, we should expect that the productivity growth will be further hampered.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the drivers behind declining business dynamism and its
implications for productivity growth. Using a longitudinal worker-firm matched
dataset that covers the universe of U.S. private sector jobs, I document that the
decline in young firm activity as accompanied by a decline in the growth of demand
for skills in the high-tech sector post-2000. Moreover, I document that the decline
in aggregate demand for skills was accompanied by a flattening of the life cycle of
skilled labor accumulation among high-tech firms.
I develop an endogenous growth firm dynamics model to study the joint evo-
lution of young firm activity and demand for skills. I incorporate adjustment costs
for skilled labor into the standard framework so that the model can be consistent
with the micro level data patterns of firms’ life cycle of skill accumulation.
I show that rising frictions in skilled labor adjustment can reconcile the em-
pirical patterns observed in the data, i.e. a decline in the young firm activity share,
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a flattening of the life cycle of firms’ skilled labor accumulation and a decline in the
aggregate demand for skills. Moreover, aggregate productivity growth is hampered
in this case, as firms accumulate a lower stock of skilled labor when they face higher
adjustment costs. By calibrating the model to the high-tech sector, I find that rising
adjustment frictions could lead to a 75 basis points decrease in productivity growth
in the high-tech sector.
The model also suggests that the productivity gain from reallocating skilled
labor from old to young firms is not always guaranteed, as a higher equilibrium
destruction rate will discourage incumbents from hiring skilled labor. This channel
offsets the gain from reallocation. Admittedly, in the current model, young firms
are equally innovative as old firms, which may leave interesting post-entry dynamics
unexplored. Future research may want to include richer post-entry dynamics to
better assess the relative strength of the two offsetting channels in equilibrium.
Finally, even though my focus has been on the high-tech sector, the method-
ology is by no means restricted to this sector alone. Aggregate patterns suggest
that the decline in demand for skills may exist more broadly outside the high-tech
sector, and it would be interesting to explore the connection between the demand
for skills and declining business dynamism and productivity growth in the broader
U.S. economy.
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Chapter 3: Innovation, Firm Size, and the Cost of Living
3.1 Introduction
1 2 Over the past decades, a large amount of research has been done to under-
stand the role of creative destruction on long-term growth (Grossman and Helpman
(1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Klette and Kortum (2004), among others) and
business cycle fluctuations (Caballero and Hammour (1996), Foster et al. (2001) Ghi-
roni and Melits (2005), among others). However, the work to empirically quantify
the impact of product creation and destruction on the cost of living and consumer
welfare is very limited. This gap is partly due to the lack of product-level price and
quantity data at a national scale, as well as a theoretical framework which incor-
porates not only product turnover, but also time-varying demand (taste) shocks at
the product level.
Measurement plays an important role in evaluating impact of innovation on
welfare. The impact of innovation on welfare depends critically on taking into
1The results in this chapter are based on researchers own analyses calculated (or derived) based
in part on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC marketing databases provided through
the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago
Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researchers
and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not
involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
2This chapter draws heavily from collaborative work from Ehrlich et al. (2020). It also builds
on closely related work from Ehrlich et al. (2019a) and Ehrlich et al. (2019b).
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account the impact of innovation on the cost of living. One method is hedonics.
In practice, hedonics is only applied to a relatively small fraction of goods by BLS
(about 5 percent). Also, hedonics is an imperfect method for this purpose. As Pakes
(2003) argues hedonics may provide better bounds than traditional price indices but
not exact price index. Recent work of Redding and Weinstein (2020) (RW) develops
a measurement method that is demand theory based and takes into account not only
product turnover (which we have known how to do since Feenstra (1994)) but also
changing relative valuation of quality/demand for continuing goods. Redding and
Weinstein find that consumer valuation bias in traditional price indices is typically
negative and they argue this is intuitive.
In this chapter, I utilize the Unified Price Index (UPI) framework proposed by
Redding and Weinstein (2020) and the Nielsen Retail Scanner Dataset (RMS) 3 to
measure the evolution of the cost of living with the presence of product creation and
destruction, firm entry and exit, and relative taste shocks to continuing goods in
the consumer goods sector in the United States. I show that in the UPI framework,
the adjustment to the traditional Sato-Vartia index is correlated with the initial
period size of a product, different from RW’s argument that the adjustment is always
negative. I then construct the UPI under a nested CES demand structure to estimate
the cost of living in the consumer goods sector and study the contribution to living
costs by firms of difference sizes.
A key contribution of Redding and Weinstein (2020) is that they argue with
3My results are based on Nielsen Scanner datasets from the Kilts Center at the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business. More information can be found from
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/kilts/datasets/nielsen.
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the existence of relative taste shocks, there is a downward adjustment - the con-
sumer valuation adjustment - to the Sato-Vartia index, since increases in tastes are
weighted more than reductions in tastes. This is equivalent to the effect of an in-
crease in the dispersion of market shares. I argue, instead, that this adjustment is
not always negative. In other words, the Sato-Vartia index is not always upward
biased. I first show analytically that in a two-good economy, the direction of the con-
sumer valuation adjustment is determined by the correlation between initial period
market shares and taste shocks. Only when taste shocks are positively correlated
with initial period market shares, the consumer valuation adjustment is negative. I
then test the implications of this result using the Nielsen RMS data and show that
this conclusion holds in the multi-good economy. This result implies that positive
relative taste shocks to large share goods will reduce the cost of living but the same
shock to small share goods will increase the cost of living, other things equal.
The dependence of the consumer valuation adjustment on the initial market
share motivates me to explore the contributions to the cost of living by firms of
different sizes. I construct the UPI under a nested CES demand system where I
assume goods within each firm are equally substitutable and there are product-
level demand shocks. A consumer can also substitute goods between firms and the
elasticity of substitution is different within and between firms.
The measured inflation by the nested UPI from the Nielsen RMS shows neg-
ative adjustments to traditional price indices, due to product turnover and relative
taste shocks over time. The measured average annual inflation by the nested UPI is
-1.0% from 2006 to 2015, compared with 0.03% given by the Laspeyres index. The
61
measured UPI inflation rates are 2.0% and -3.1% for food and non-food respectively,
compared to 3.0% and 0.0% from the Laspeyres index.
Large firms drive down the cost of living in the aggregate economy by driving
down the consumer valuation adjustment. Without top 5 firms from each product
group, the cost of living would have increased by 14% from 2006 to 2015, or 1.4%
on an annual basis. Meanwhile, the role of large firms is different across product
groups.
In the innovation intensive sector (eg. electronics), large firms engage in more
active product creation and destruction that drives down the cost of living. On the
other hand, the dispersion of market shares across products in large firms decreases
over time, introducing a positive consumer valuation adjustment. In the less innova-
tion intensive sector (eg. snacks), there is limited product creation and destruction.
Moreover, the dispersion of product expenditure within large firms in this sector
increases over time, hence drives down the cost of living.
This chapter is closely related to the literature which studies the estimation
of exact CES price indices. Feenstra (1994) proposes an adjustment to traditional
price indices (Feenstra-adjustment) to take into account product turnover effects.
Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate a CES exact index for import price considering
the introduction of new varieties. Broda and Weinstein (2010) first attempted to
use item-level transaction datasets to estimate a cost-of-living index. Redding and
Weinstein (2020) formally propose the UPI framework and introduce the consumer
valuation bias to the traditional Sato-Vartia index. Argente et al. (2019b) use
the approach from Redding and Weinstein (2020) to study the cost of living in
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Mexico and the US with Nielsen Consumer Panel data. This chapter contributes to
the literature by showing the relationship between the initial product size and the
direction of the consumer valuation bias in Redding and Weinstein (2020). Using the
UPI framework and the Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset, I estimate that the average
inflation rate in the consumer goods sector in the United States is should be -1.0%
from 2006 to 2015.
More broadly, this chapter is related to the literature which aim to incorporate
quality updating to price indices using hedonic approaches. The papers include
Feenstra (1995), Diewert (2003), Pakes (2003), Benkard and Bajari (2005), Erickson
and Pakes (2011), Diewert et al. (2017), among others. Estimated prices indices
from the Nielsen RMS in this chapter compliment to the estimates from hedonic
approaches.
This chapter is also closely related to the literature that utilizes transaction-
level price and quantity data to measure economics activities and firm behaviors.
Ehrlich et al. (2019a) compare the BLS CPI to alternative price indices such as the
Feenstra (1994) price index and the UPI constructed from Nielsen Retail Scanner
Data. Ehrlich et al. (2019b) explore in more detail the UPI and hedonic approaches
for estimating price and quantity indices in large-scale item-level data. Ehrlich et al.
(2019b) also discuss opportunities and challenges statistical agencies are facing in
this new century. On the firm dynamics front, Argente et al. (2019a) match the
Nielsen RMS data to USPTO to study firms innovation behavior and the differ-
ence between large and small firms. This chapter estimates the cost of living in
the consumer good sector and studies the contribution of large and small firms by
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constructing the UPI under a nested CES structure.
3.2 Data
The data source is the Nielsen Retail Scanner data (also referred to as RMS)
from the Kilts Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business for
the 2006 to 2015 period. The original data consists of over 2.6 million products
identified by the finest level of aggregation - 12-digit universal product code (UPC)
that uniquely identify specific goods.4 The RMS data are collected from over 40, 000
individual stores from approximately 90 retail chains in over 370 MSAs in the US.
Total sales in Nielsen RMS are worth around $2 trillion and represent 53% of all
sales in grocery stores, 55% in drug stores, 32% in mass merchandisers and 2% in
convenience stores.
Nielsen organizes barcode-level goods into 10 department, 115 product groups5
and over 1000 product modules. A typical department is, for example, dry grocery,
which consists of 41 product groups such as baby food, coffee and carbonated bev-
erage. Within the carbonated beverage product group, there are product modules
such as soft drinks and fountain beverage. In the analysis later, I construct product
group level price indices and then aggregate them to form an aggregate price index
for the the consumer goods sector. The choice of product group for lower level aggre-
gation is based on the tradeoff between the substitutability between goods and the
4In the Nielsen data, there are both UPC code and UPC version code. The unique product
identifier used in my analysis is the combination of UPC and UPC version code.
5I keep 106 product groups for which elasticities of substitution can be estimated for later
analysis.
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sample size for firm-level analysis within a group. The product groups are classified
into food and non-food sectors based on the BLS correspondence (Table 3.1 and 3.2
list the product groups in food and non-food respectively).
The RMS consists of more than 100 billion unique observations at the week×
store × UPC level. I first aggregate the weekly data into monthly according to
the National Retail Federation (NRF) calendar6 and then aggregate the monthly
data to quarterly.7 The NRF calendar is a guide for retailers that ensures sales
comparability between years by dividing a year into months based on a 4 weeks - 5
weeks - 4 weeks format. The layout of the calendar lines up holidays and ensures the
same number of Saturdays and Sundays in comparable months. The NRF calendar
ensures the comparability of the aggregated sales over time.
To identify manufacturers of UPCs, I use the matching between UPC code
and firm identifier provided by from GS1 US which is the single official source of
UPCs. After matching RMS to GS1, I obtain a sample of over 47,000 firms.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 provide summary statistics of the 2015 Q3 snapshot
for each product group. The median number of UPC in a product group is 2767, and
the median number of firms in a product group is 340. The average number of UPC
per firm ranges from 14 at the 5th percentile to 430 at the 95th percentile. Average
firm sales in a product group range from $1.4 million at the 5th percentile to $68
million at the 95th percentile. In terms of average UPC sales, they are $16,000 at
the 5th percentile, and $290,000 at the 95th percentile.
6NRF calendars are collected from the NRF website: https://nrf.com/resources/4-5-4-calendar
7Before aggregating to quarterly, I drop outliers, defined as the observations with price above
3 times median or below 1/3 of median for each UPC in a given month. I also drop observations
whose quantity is about 24 times of the median quantity in a given month.
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Nupc Nupc per Firm Nfirm Avg. Firm Sales Avg. UPC Sales
Baby food 1,484 38 185 51,800 319
Candy 17,533 1,247 164 39,900 76
Fruit - canned 1,185 246 22 2,268 59
Gum 1,141 114 202 52,200 177
Jams, jellies, spreads 3,622 609 30 8,012 64
Juice, drinks - canned, bottled 7,000 789 58 25,100 192
Prepared food-ready-to-serve 4,748 807 41 7,304 95
Prepared food-dry mixes 3,171 485 38 12,000 146
Seafood - canned 1,624 239 33 7,454 88
Soup 2,957 395 90 36,300 145
Baking mixes 2,040 281 48 8,262 75
Breakfast food 1,972 198 77 31,200 202
Cereal 2,574 295 97 55,600 303
Coffee 4,816 442 68 25,100 177
Desserts, gelatins, syrup 1,606 285 30 5,304 99
Flour 861 204 18 1,448 55
Fruit - dried 2,232 291 27 3,857 66
Nuts 4,125 400 45 6,414 67
Packaged milk and modifiers 1,200 214 35 21,700 234
Pasta 3,356 370 36 3,347 44
Pickles, olives, and relish 3,644 477 33 2,281 37
Salad dressings, mayo, toppings 2,339 384 47 11,700 120
Shortening, oil 1,776 405 14 2,591 98
Spices, seasoning, extracts 11,535 1,123 113 5,631 20
Sugar, sweeteners 705 204 13 4,027 137
Table syrups, molasses 731 210 8 689 58
Tea 5,023 545 54 8,012 83
Vegetables and grains - dried 2,077 322 29 2,551 42
Bread and baked goods 14,494 1,284 90 9,334 93
Carbonated beverages 6,556 477 232 141,000 290
Cookies 6,172 871 50 17,300 82
Crackers 2,142 365 33 22,300 197
Snacks 16,431 1,623 144 73,200 119
Soft drinks-non-carbonated 4,343 896 41 10,400 158
Baked goods-frozen 1,299 278 15 2,482 95
Breakfast foods-frozen 1,030 178 22 12,100 231
Ice cream, novelties 5,883 319 85 14,200 126
Juices, drinks-frozen 196 34 14 1,764 88
Pizza/snacks/hors doeurves-frzn 2,905 491 29 15,600 173
Prepared foods-frozen 7,216 1,035 42 17,100 155
Unprep meat/poultry/seafood-frzn 2,441 484 24 2,004 82
Vegetables-frozen 2,125 214 71 12,500 129
Butter and margarine 590 167 13 9,293 368
Cheese 7,213 571 103 25,000 120
Cot cheese, sour cream, toppings 1,395 214 20 2,206 117
Dough products 391 77 66 42,200 329
Eggs 613 165 9 4,340 265
Milk 3,829 287 46 11,400 162
Pudding, desserts-dairy 275 61 17 4,399 134
Snacks, spreads, dips-dairy 2,640 575 24 1,976 72
Yogurt 2,976 180 94 38,800 241
Dressings/salads/prep foods-deli 8,134 1,156 79 7,836 120
Packaged meats-deli 8,206 683 129 15,400 161
Fresh meat 1,011 218 24 4,539 257
Fresh produce 9,302 1,277 166 37,300 145
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of food product groups. Snapshot at 2015 Q3. Quar-
terly sales in thousands 66
Nupc Nupc per Firm Nfirm Avg. Firm Sales Avg. UPC Sales
Pet food 5,150 282 182 62,600 189
Ice 383 201 5 1,776 147
Detergents 2,634 115 459 220,000 318
Disposable diapers 1,397 19 494 162,000 286
Fresheners and deodorizers 5,375 302 168 14,000 41
Household cleaners 2,631 419 46 12,300 122
Household supplies 6,146 705 74 4,611 50
Laundry supplies 2,827 369 76 19,300 124
Paper products 10,752 482 377 52,400 121
Personal soap and bath additives 6,191 545 125 19,300 70
Pet care 9,317 614 143 3,139 32
Tobacco & accessories 6,774 342 167 99,800 245
Wrapping materials and bags 1,545 218 82 28,500 171
Beer 12,210 1,296 65 34,900 130
Liquor 13,550 866 291 18,700 61
Wine 22,734 2,790 79 10,800 55
Automotive 1,696 190 32 1,573 36
Batteries and flashlights 2,514 289 212 35,400 89
Books and magazines 726 39 42 5,010 106
Canning, freezing supplies 206 46 26 4,979 130
Charcoal, logs, accessories 881 241 19 3,936 75
Electronics, records, tapes 23,746 452 977 14,100 14
Floral, gardening 972 120 58 870 10
Glassware, tableware 18,237 744 200 1,548 8
Hardware, tools 4,523 503 153 11,400 39
Housewares, appliances 6,960 468 126 10,800 80
Insecticds/pesticds/rodenticds 1,662 222 52 5,935 50
Kitchen gadgets 19,261 1,276 259 3,698 12
Light bulbs, electric goods 5,294 373 340 15,700 30
Photographic supplies 344 50 24 2,206 86
Sewing notions 403 100 21 676 28
Shoe care 569 46 81 2,413 16
Stationery, school supplies 22,846 1,027 242 9,535 24
Baby needs 3,847 338 80 5,821 62
Cosmetics 25,850 396 1,002 32,700 25
Cough and cold remedies 2,002 199 46 15,600 259
Deodorant 1,666 80 202 47,600 173
Diet aids 282 56 28 3,942 116
Ethnic haba 407 58 24 1,103 38
Feminine hygiene 392 89 15 3,353 146
First aid 2,707 485 44 5,292 71
Fragrances - women 4,725 346 142 1,900 12
Grooming aids 10,061 515 530 12,600 19
Hair care 14,412 474 430 24,200 57
Medications/remedies/health aids 11,102 1,079 82 11,100 112
Men’s toiletries 1,523 177 46 828 20
Oral hygiene 2,985 229 167 49,200 197
Sanitary protection 1,015 27 174 53,400 255
Shaving needs 1,365 126 173 68,200 234
Skin care preparations 7,366 665 101 12,200 66
Vitamins 10,941 952 116 11,600 74
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of non-food product groups. Snapshot at 2015 Q3.
Quarterly sales in thousands.
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One feature of barcode (UPC) is that goods of different size and packaging have
different barcodes. To ensure the comparability between prices, I follow Hottman
et al. (2016) and normalize UPC prices to the same unit (oz), utilizing the size and
packaging information provided by Nielsen. To deal with outlier issues, I winsorize
the price change at the top and bottom 1% of each product group.
3.3 Measuring the Exact Cost of Living under Product Creative De-
struction and Relative Taste Shocks: the Unified Price Index
Framework
Redding and Weinstein (2020) propose an Unified Price Index (UPI) frame-
work under CES demand to measure the exact cost of living when there are product
turnover and relative taste shocks. In this section, I first describe the flat UPI pro-
posed in RW. Then, in a two-good economy, I show analytically that the direction of
the consumer valuation bias, the critical component in RW, depends on the correla-
tion between relative taste shocks and the initial period size of a product, different
from RW’s argument that relative taste shocks will always lead to a downward ad-
justment to the Sato-Vartia index. I then consider a nested CES structure where
there are item-level demand shocks, goods entry and exit, and firm entry and exit
to study the contribution to the living cost by firms of difference sizes.
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3.3.1 The Flat UPI



















where u indicates goods (UPC), g indicates product group. ΩUgt is the set of goods
in product group g that have positive sales at time t. ϕugt is the appeal of good u,
and σUg is the elasticity of substitution within product group g.
Under the normalization assumption that the geometric average of product
































































Φg,flatt−1,t is the exact price index under the CES preference, and is called the
Unified Price Index (UPI) by Redding and Weinstein (2020). Equation 3.5 is the
consumer valuation (CV) bias term, 3.6 is the common goods price relative, or the






in 3.3 is the Feenstra-adjustment term for
UPC entry and exit.
3.3.2 Initial Period Market Share and the Direction of Consumer
Valuation Bias
A key contribution of Redding and Weinstein (2020) is that they argue that
the Sato-Vartia index is upward biased when there are relative demand shocks cross
goods. The bias is measured by the consumer valuation bias term (equation 3.5).
While RW argue that increases in tastes are weighted more than reductions in tastes
hence relative taste shocks increase dispersion in market shares and result in a
upward bias in the Sato-Vartia index, I show in this section, in a two-good economy,
that the Sato-Vartia index is not always upward biased. The direction of the bias is
determined by the correlation between the initial period market share and the taste
shock. When the relative appeal of the high market share good (“winning” good)
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increases, the consumer valuation bias adjustment will be negative (hence the Sato-
Vartia index is upward biased). However, if the relative appeal of the low market
share good increases, the consumer valuation bias adjustment will be positive (hence
the Sato-Vartia index is downward biased).
3.3.2.1 A Two-Good Economy












Yt = p1tC1t + p2tC2t.
























Now consider the case where prices remain constant, i.e. put = put−1 and there
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are taste shocks to ϕut, i.e. ϕut 6= ϕut−1. Since prices of goods do not change, a
conventional price index, whether it is Laspeyres, Paasche, or Sato-Vartia, doesn’t
change between t− 1 to t.








Normalization of taste shocks gives
ϕ1tϕ2t = 1, (3.10)







Now equation 3.9 can be written as
























and in log form, we have












The second term in this equation is the consumer valuation bias.










, x = s1t/s2t, is deceasing with respect to x. Therefore
f(xt) < f(xt−1) if and only if s1t/s2t > s1t−1/s2t−1, since s1t + s2t = 1, this is
equivalent to say f(xt) < f(xt−1) if and only if s1t > s1t−1. So we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: In a two-good economy with the elasticity of substitution σ > 1,
and only relative taste shocks, assume s1t−1 > s2t−1, UPIt < UPIt−1 if and only if
s1t > s1t−1, where sut is expenditure share of good u at time t.
The intuition is that if it is easy for the representative consumer to substitute
goods, i.e. σ > 1, the living cost is lower if the dispersion of the quality adjusted price
is higher, making it more effective for a substitution of cheap goods for expensive
goods.
This intuition can be generalized to an economy with more than two goods.
Given the consumer valuation bias is a concave function of the expenditure share,
what is behind the two-good result is a change in the dispersion of the expenditure
shares. More specifically, a larger dispersion is associated with a lower cost of living,
because it implies a stronger substitution of relatively cheap goods (those with large
expenditure shares) for relatively expensive goods (those with small expenditure
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shares)–this substitution is not captured by traditional indexes but by the univer-
sal price index. This force clearly does not depend on the number of goods. For
example, if the good with the largest expenditure further gains expenditure shares
and the rest of the goods, whose number can exceed two, do not experience a signif-
icant change in their relative market shares, we may expect the same consequence
of higher dispersion in expenditure shares and a decline in the consumer valuation
bias. The key to emphasize is that it is not the change in expenditure share that
matters for the consumer valuation bias, but what the initial expenditure share is
for those that indeed experience a change in their expenditure share.
Proposition 1 is consistent with Redding and Weinstein (2020)’s argument
that an increase in the dispersion in expenditure shares will lead to a decrease in
the consumer valuation bias. However, the difference between Proposition 1 and
Redding and Weinstein (2020) is that RW regard relative taste shocks across goods
to be always dispersion enhancing, hence the consumer valuation bias term is always
negative under relative taste shocks. Proposition 1, instead, says that consumer
valuation bias is negative if and only if the relative appeal of the large share good
continue to increase (or equivalently small goods continue to shrink).
This proposition also suggests that innovation from small and large firms may
have different implications for the aggregate cost of living. If small firms have
successful innovations but do not lower their prices, they will gain market share and
reduce the dispersion of the quality-adjusted price, which is not good for the living
cost to decline. In contrast, successful innovation from large firms can reduce the
consumer valuation bias and lower the cost of living.
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These results motivate me to study the contribution of firms of different sizes
to the living cost, which arguably can help reveal firms’ innovation and pricing
behaviors.
3.3.2.2 Empirical Tests for Proposition 1
To test the predictions of Proposition 1, I first back out relative taste shocks
from the data (the derivation will be explained in section 3.3.5) and run following








= c2 + bg ln
sut
sut−1
+ It + Iu + δut, (3.15)
where sut is the expenditure share of good u at time t. It and Iu are time fixed
effects and product fixed effects respectively.
The second step is to collect the estimated coefficients ag and bg for all product
groups and regress the consumer valuation bias (CV) on ag and bg separately:
CVg = c3 + β × ag + κg (3.16)
CVg = c4 + γ × bg + νg. (3.17)
If Proposition 1 holds in the data, we should expect β to be negative, i.e. when
relative taste shocks are correlated with initial period market shares, the consumer
valuation adjustment is negative. If the force described by Redding and Weinstein
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(2020) holds in the data, i.e. changes in expenditure shares are positively correlated
with relative taste shocks, we should expect γ to be negative.
3.3.3 The UPI under Nested CES Demand
Now I derive the nested UPI under the CES demand similar to Hottman et al.
(2016) (HRW). In the baseline case, I assume there are only item-level taste shocks.
Then in the full case, I add firm-level taste shocks.





















The real consumption in any product group, g, is a function of the consumption of
each firm f ’s output, Cfgt, and adjusted for the substitutability of the output of each
firm. The elasticity of substitution between firms, denoted by σFg , is greater than
1. The subutility derived from the consumption of a firm f ’s output within product
group g is a function of the quantity consumed of each UPI (barcode) u, Cufgt,
weighted by the consumer appeal of that UPC’s output, ϕufgt > 0, and adjusted
for the substitutability between barcodes supplied by the firm. The elasticity of
substitution within firms, denoted by σUg , is greater than 1. The set of firms that
are active at time t is denoted by ΩFgt, and the set of active products of firm f at time
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t is denoted by ΩUfgt. For future reference, it is useful to define the set of products
within firm f that exist throughout the time period t− 1, t, i.e the common goods,
as ΩUfgt,t−1. This nested specification allows for the introduction of new UPCs to
firms and new firms to each product group.















)1−σFg ] 11−σFg . (3.21)
Applying Shephard’s Lemma, we obtain the expenditure share for each good
























3.3.3.1 Entry and Exit
Feenstra (1994) shows that under CES preference, there is a tractable way of
correcting the entry and exit of new product varieties in price indices. I implement
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this variety correction at both product and firm level.
Within a firm f , we can partition the set of UPCs active at time t into the set
of goods that are common in both t − 1 and t, ΩUfgt,t−1, and the set of goods that
enter between period t− 1 to t. Similarly, we can partition the set of UPCs active
at time t − 1 into the set of goods that are common in both t − 1 and t, ΩUfgt,t−1,
and the set of good that exit between period t− 1 to t.
Within a product group g, there can be firm entry and exit. Denote the firms
that are common between t− 1 and t by ΩFgt,t−1. We can partition ΩFgt into common
firms,ΩFgt,t−1, and firms that enter during t− 1 to t. Similarly, the set of firms that
are active at t− 1 (ΩFgt−1) can be partitioned into ΩFgt,t−1 and firms that exit during
t− 1 to t.
Using this notation, the change in the exact price index within a firm f in








































Common goods prices P ∗fgt and P
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If entering goods are more numerous or have lower quality-adjusted prices than
exiting goods, the Feenstra adjustment term is less than 1, and the exact price index
will fall.
Given common goods prices, we can define the common goods expenditure






















which takes the summation of the common goods instead of all active goods in 3.22.
Within a product group g, I allow for the entry and exit of firms. I define the










































)1−σFg ] 11−σFg . (3.30)





















3.3.3.2 The Exact Price Index for Common Goods/Firms
The exact price index under taste shocks can be written as a function of
observable prices and expenditure shares by applying certain normalization over
taste (ϕ) shocks following Redding and Weinstein (2020).8 Following the same
approach, the change in the cost of living for common goods within a firm f in
































8In particular, Redding and Weinstein (2020) assumes that the geometric average of the taste
shocks is zero under the law of large numbers. They also demonstrate the robustness of their
results under other normalization assumptions.
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where Nt,t−1 is the number of goods in the common goods set Ω
U
fgt,t−1, and a tilde
over a variable denotes a geometric average of a variable across the common goods
set.
Within a product group across firms, the exact price index is the Sato-Vartia


























3.3.3.3 The Nested UPI
Assume the utility at the time t is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of real consump-







αgt = 1, (3.35)
where g denotes product group, αgt is the expenditure share of group g at time t,
and ΩG is the set of product groups and it is constant over time. Now I can write
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Note that 3.38 is the CES Unified Price Index index as defined in Redding and
Weinstein (2020); 3.37 is the Feenstra-adjusted Sato-Vartia index at the firm level.
Under such specification, I can further decompose the exact price index at
product group level into the contribution of firm entry and exit, goods (UPC) entry






















P̃ ∗fgt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸









C: consumer valuation bias
. (3.39)
Equation 3.39 shows that the contribution of goods entry exit to the product
group level price index is a weighted average of firm-level product entry and exit,
with the weight being the Sato-Vartia weight, and adjusted for the elasticity of
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substitution between different goods. The product group level consumer valuation
bias is the Sato-Vartia weighted firm-level consumer valuation bias, adjusted for the
elasticity of substitution between different goods. The common goods price change
is the Sato-Vartia weighted common goods price change at the firm level within a
product group. Equation 3.39 also suggests that the between-firm elasticity σFg only
affects the firm entry and exit term where there aren’t firm-level demand shocks.
3.3.4 The Nested UPI with Firm-Level Demand Shocks
Introducing taste shocks at the firm level will give the same demand system


















where ϕfgt is firm appeal and ϕufgt is product appeal.
























where NFgt−1,t is the number of firms common in t − 1 and t, Φ
fg
t−1,t is defined in
equation 3.38, and S∗fgt and S
∗
fgt−1 are common firm expenditure shares defined in
equation 3.31.
Compared to equation 3.39, the formulation in equation 3.41 considers the
expenditure share change between firms under relative firm-level taste shocks.
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3.3.5 Inferring Relative Taste Shocks from Prices and Quantities
Using the estimated elasticity of substitution σ, we can invert the CES demand
system to solve for time-varying demand shocks ln(ϕkt/ϕkt−1).






















Denote the geometric average of a variable x over the common goods set by x̃∗.
Taking geometric averages of both sides over the common goods set and dividing
ϕkt by ϕ̃
∗



















Taking log on both side and applying the normalization assumption that the average
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Equation 3.46 shows that relative demand shocks can be inferred from the observed
price and quantity data for a given σ.
3.4 Estimating the Elasticity of Substitution
The computation of the exact price index relies on the estimates of within
and between firm elasticities of substitution σUg and σ
F
g . I use the methodology in
Hottman et al. (2016) (HRW), which is built upon Feenstra (1994) and Broda and
Weinstein (2006). The elasticities are closely related to the estimates in Ehrlich
et al. (2019b) and Ehrlich et al. (2020). I describe intuitions and key equations in
the HRW estimation procedure in this section.
3.4.1 Estimating σUg
The basic problem here is to obtain a demand and supply equation with in-
formation on prices and quantities only. The standard endogeneity problem exists
where we do not know the slopes of the demand and supply equations that generated
the observed data. Leontief (1929) suggests that the observed prices and quantities
for a given good (UPC) can be represented by a hyperbola which is described by
9Redding and Weinstein (2020) assumes that the mean log-demand shocks across common




demand (σ) and supply (δ) elasticities. The true elasticities maximize the likelihood
function that satisfy the hyperbola.
The insight from Feenstra (1994) is that the panel structure of the data allows
us to obtain a different hyperbola for each UPC as long as demand and supply
shocks are not drawn from the same distribution as another UPC. Assuming that
elasticities of supply and demand are the same for each UPC within a product group
and that the relative variances of demand and supply shocks differ across UPCs, the
hyperbolas do not overlap. Hence we can identify σ and δ as the point at which the
hyperbolas intersect.
Given the intuition above, the procedure can be written down formally. Double-
differencing the log UPC expenditure share (3.22) over time and relative to the
largest UPC within each firm gives:
∆ut lnSufgt = (1− σUg )∆ut lnPufgt + νufgt. (3.47)
Similarly, let δg be the inverse supply elasticity of product group g, the double-




∆ut lnSufgt + κufgt, (3.48)
where νufgt and κufgt are stochastic demand and supply residuals.
The first identifying assumption is that the double-differenced supply and
10In particular, we can write down the UPC pricing rule as Pufgt = µfgtγufgt, with µfgt being the
market up and γufgt being the marginal cost, and the cost function Aufgt(Yufgt) = aufgt(Yufgt)
1+δ.
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demand shocks are orthogonal. This follows standard approaches in the interna-
tional trade and macroeconomics literature (Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein
(2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010)). The double-differencing procedure eliminates
common firm-level shocks and time-invariant product-specific shocks and hence ad-
dresses the standard endogeneity concerns. The orthogonality condition gives a set
of moment conditions:




The second identifying assumption is that the double-differenced demand and







with χ2x being the variance of x. This assumption ensures that the hyperbolas formed
by different UPCs do not overlap.
For each product group, I stack all the UPC moment conditions together and
the GMM estimator is given by
β̂g = arg min{G∗(βg)′WG∗(βg)}, (3.51)
where G∗(.) is the sample analog of G(.), and W is a positive definite weighting
matrix. With consumer panel data from Nielsen, Hottman et al. (2016) weight the
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data for each UPC by the number of raw buyers for that UPC to reduce measurement
errors. With scanner data, in a similar spirit, I weight the data for each UPC by
the number of units sold to diminish the influence of unrepresentative prices.
Finally, the sample moment condition can be written as a function of ob-
served price and quantities data and model parameters σUg and δg as follows (I omit
























































(σUg − 2)δg − 1
1 + δg
z̄1(u), (3.53)









Given the estimate of σUg , I can compute firm price indices based on 3.38 to
get Pfgt. Double-differencing the firm expenditure share over time and relative to
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the largest firm within each product group, we have:
∆f,t lnSfgt = (1− σFg )∆f,t lnPfgt + εfgt. (3.54)
Estimating equation 3.54 using OLS could be problematic because changes in firm
price indexes can be correlated with changes in firm appeal. To find an instrument









and the normalization assumption ϕ̃fgt = 1, we have













The last term in equation 3.56 measures the dispersion of the expenditure
shares. The structure of the model implies that the dispersion of the UPC expen-
diture share only affects the share of the firm through the firm price index Pfgt.
Double-differencing equation 3.56 over time and relative to the largest firm within
each product-group, we have:
∆f,t lnP Ffgt = ∆











The second term on the right hand side containing the UPC expenditure shares is a
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suitable instrument for the double differenced firm price index in equation 3.54. 11
3.5 Estimated Elasticities of Substitution
Table 3.3 summarizes the estimated “within” (σU) and “between” (σF ) firm
elasticities for the 106 product groups, as well as a flat σU using the Feenstra (1994)
procedure. Note that the difference in estimating procedures for the flat σU and
the within σU lies in how we perform the double-differencing operation. When
estimating within σU , I double difference along time and relative to the largest firm
within each product-group; while when estimating flat σU , I double-difference along
time and relative to the geometric average of the variable in the product group.
The median estimate of σU is 6.65, and σU ranges from 3.42 at the 5th per-
centile to 18.12 at the 95th percentile. σF ranges from 1.24 at the 5th percentile to
5.56 at the 95th percentile, with the median being 2.29. The fact that σU is greater
than σF suggests that goods within a firm is more substitutable than goods between
firms.
This set of estimates is comparable to the estimates obtained in the literature.
Using the Consumer Panel data from Nielsen, Hottman et al. (2016) estimate that
the median of σU to be 6.9 with the 95th and 5th percentile being 17.6 and 4.7.
The median of σF from HRW is 3.9, with the the 95th and 5th percentile being 8.5
and 2.3. My estimated σF from the Retail Scanner data is on average lower than
HRW’s estimates from the Consumer Panel. This may suggest that goods supplied
11Ehrlich et al. (2020) consider improving the HRW between firm estimator by using common
goods expenditure shares as an instrument to further eliminate the concern that εfgt might be
correlated with the number of goods.
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Percentile σU σF σU,F lat
Min 2.80 1.06 3.07
5% 3.42 1.24 3.65
10% 4.12 1.39 4.24
25% 4.81 1.76 5.35
50% 6.65 2.29 8.06
75% 9.48 3.05 11.55
90% 13.00 4.05 16.14
95% 18.12 5.56 18.49
Max 38.83 15.93 28.90
Table 3.3: Distribution of the estimated elasticities across 106 Nielsen RMS product
groups
by smaller firms are harder to substitute between firms. For the flat σU , Redding
and Weinstein (2020) report a median of 6.48 with the 95th and 5th percentile
being 8.5 and 5.1 using data from Nielsen Consumer Panel. The estimates are also
consistent with Ehrlich et al. (2019b) where the median estimate for the flat σ is 8
using the scanner data.
3.6 The Measured Cost of Living
I now turn to the price indices estimated from the Nielsen Retail Scanner
(RMS) data. I construct the following five indices: (1) Laspeyres, (2) Sato-Vartia,
(3) Sato-Vartia with Feenstra adjustment for product entry and exit, (4) flat UPI,
and (5) nested UPI. I calculate price indices for each product group and the aggre-
gate index is a Divisia-weighted index of the product group level price indices. The
nested UPI in this section is the baseline case defined in equation 3.36 through 3.38.
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3.6.1 Aggregate Price Indices
I first look at the aggregate price indices for the consumer goods sector repre-
sented by the 106 Nielsen RMS product groups from 2006 to 2015. Figure 3.1 plots
the chained indices. The Laspeyres index was largely flat during this time period,
and the Sato-Vartia index declined by 12 percent from 2006 to 2015. Product en-
try and exit, represented by the Feenstra adjustment term to the Sato-Vartia index
contributed an additional 8-percent decline to the Sato-Vartia index. The flat UPI
declined by 26 percent and the nested UPI declined by 11 percent.
Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding annual growth rate for each index. The
average annual inflation measured by the Laspeyres index is 0.03%, by the Sato-
Vartia index is −1.2%, and by the Feenstra-adjusted Sato-Vartia index is −2.1%.
The flat UPI shows an annual inflation of −3.1%, and the nested UPI shows an
annual inflation rate of of −1.0%. The nested UPI lies above the flat UPI, suggesting
that the between-goods substitution is better captured in a nested structure. In
other words, goods within a firm are more substitutable than goods between firms.
In terms of the cyclicality, all five indices exhibit similar cyclical behaviors, with the
nested UPI shows a more significant decline in 2009 than the other four.
The nested UPI exhibits a downward adjustment to the traditional CPI mea-
sured by a Laspeyres index. To study what leads to this negative adjustment, I
breakdown the nested UPI into four components: the firm entry and exit adjust-
ment, the product entry and exit adjustment, common goods price relative and the
consumer valuation bias adjustment according to equation 3.39.
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate price indices. This figure plots the chained price indices for
all Nielsen Retail Scanner product groups, with indices at 2006 Q1 normalized to 1.
The solid blue line is the Laspeyres index. The red dotted line is the Sato-Vartia
index. The yellow dashed line is the Sato-Vartia index with Feenstra adjustment
term for product entry and exit. The purple dash-dotted line is the flat UPI and
the solid green line is the nested UPI.
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate price indices in annual growth rate. This figure plots the
four-quarter cummulative percentage change of the price indices. The solid blue
line is the Laspeyres index. The red dotted line is the Sato-Vartia index. The
yellow dashed line is the Sato-Vartia index with the Feenstra adjustment term for
product entry and exit. The purple dash-dotted line is the flat UPI and solid green
line is the nested UPI.
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Common Goods Price Relative
Figure 3.3: This figure shows the decomposition of the annual inflation rate into
four components: firm entry and exit, product entry and exit, consumer valuation
bias and common goods price relative (Jevons index). The blue dotted line is the
firm entry and exit adjustment component; the red dashed line is the product entry
exit component, the yellow dash-dotted line is the consumer valuation bias and the
solid purple line the common goods price relative.
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Figure 3.3 shows the result. The firm entry and exit adjustment is largely flat,
suggesting that entering firms don’t necessarily have higher quality goods. This
may due to the fact that it takes time for a new firm to roll out its products, or it
takes time for consumers to appreciate a new product. Product turnover, measured
by the UPC entry and exit component, contributes 0.8% annual decline in the cost
of living, suggesting that entering goods typically have better quality than exiting
goods. Common goods price relative (Jevons index) is an unweighted average of
price changes of goods within firms. This component mimic the fluctuation of the
Laspeyres index and averaged at −1.2%. Negative common goods price relative
suggests that goods in the economy has declined in nominal price over time. The
gap between the common goods price relative and the Laspeyres index implies that
prices of small share goods have declined more than prices of large share goods.
The consumer valuation bias component has an average of 1.0%. It declined
from 2007 to 2010 and increased afterwards. This term is calculated as an un-
weighted average of the expenditure share relatives and is a variant of the Theil
index of dispersion. When the dispersion of expenditure shares increases overtime,
the consumer valuation bias is negative; when the dispersion shrinks, the bias turns
positive. In particular, the dispersion of expenditure shares will rise when “winning”
(large share) goods keep gaining market share, and “loosing” (small share) goods
keep loosing market share. In contrast, when small share goods win market share
over large share goods, the consumer valuation will be positive.
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3.6.2 The Common Goods Rule
One feature of the consumer valuation bias is that it is an unweighted average
of common goods expenditure share changes from t− 1 to t. Hence any given dollar
amount of expenditure loss (gain) of a small share good to (from) a large share good
will result in a negative (positive) bias, as this dollar amount change will incur a large
decline (increase) in the expenditure share of the small share good but only a small
increase (decline) in the expenditure share of the large share good. The sensitivity
of the consumer valuation bias to small share goods and the presence of a large left
tail in the Nielsen Retail Scanner data may give rise to a significant negative bias
in the measured UPI. In particular, if small shares are related to the geographic
roll-out of a good, or to the slow death process of goods, the measured UPI will not
correctly reflect changes in the cost of living for a national representative consumer.
I apply a common goods rule (CGR) to the data to account for this small share
issue (this CGR will be further analyzed in Ehrlich et al. (2020)). This common
goods rule says that in order for a good to be counted as a common good between
t− 1 to t, it needs to have positive sales in both time t and time t− 1 and its sales
must be above a certain threshold. Otherwise, this good will be classified as an
entering or exiting good. This rule is similar to the longevity rule used in Redding
and Weinstein (2020) where they require a good to be present in the sample for a
total of 6 years or more in order to be counted as a common good. The drawback
of their method is twofold. First, the 6-year window is too long when considering
the life cycle of products in the innovation intensive sector, such as electronics, and
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second, it is a “backward looking” method and can not be implemented in real time.
The threshold in the empirical analysis is inferred from the Nielsen Consumer
Panel data (HMS). In particular, I construct a flat UPI using HMS and define the
threshold to be the xth percentile of the sales distribution calculated using UPC sales
information in the 4 quarters preceding t for each product group at any time t.12 I
vary x until the calculated UPI matches the UPI in Redding and Weinstein (2020).
This procedure gives an x of 5. I then calculate the corresponding dollar amount of
sales of the 5th percentile of the sales distribution at any t for every product group.
A time series of the implied threshold for each product group is then applied to
the Retail Scanner Data. The implied threshold is equivalent to the 30th to 50th
percentile of the sales distribution in the RMS.
In a back-of-the-envelop calculation, I shown that small shares (sales) corre-
spond to the entry and exit process, i.e. entering and exiting goods tend to have
smaller sales and expenditure shares. In this sense, the CGR used in my analysis can
be regarded to as a real-time version of the longevity rule in Redding and Weinstein
(2020).
3.6.3 Food vs. Non-Food
Nielsen retail scanner covers grocery and mass merchandiser stores sales and
the goods can be grouped into food and non-food categories. Ehrlich et al. (2019a)
compare the BLS and Nielsen data sources in detail and show that the Laspeyres
12I choose to include sales information for the past 4 quarters since it gives more data to compute
a reliable distribution and it will also takes into account the seasonality in sales.
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and the Feenstra indices constructed from the scanner data follow closely the BLS
CPI food and non-food series and that the traditional price indices are missing
substantial quality adjustments. In this section, I compare the nested UPI to the
traditional price indices in the food and non-food sector separately, and explore
differences in the food and non-food sector by looking at the components of the
nested UPI.
Figure 3.4 shows the results. In the food sector, as shown in Panel (A1) of
Figure 3.4, tradition CPI (Laspeyres) implies a rise in the cost of living by 32%
from 2006 to 2015. Increases in the cost of living measured by the Sato-Vartia and
the Feenstra-adjusted Sato-Vartia indices are at 9% and 6% respectively. The flat
UPI implies an increase of 51%. The nested UPI implies an increase in the cost of
living by 20% from 2006 to 2015. In terms of annual inflation rates, as shown in
Panel (A2) of Figure 3.4, the Laspeyres index gives an annual inflation of 3.0%. The
inflation rates given by the Sato-Vartia index and the Feenstra-adjusted Sato-Vartia
index are 1.0% and 0.7% respectively. The flat UPI implies an annual inflation of
4.4% and the nested UPI implies an inflation rate of 2.0%.
In the non-food sector, as shown in Panel (B1) of Figure 3.4, the measured
cost of living declined from 2006 to 2015 in all indices except for the tradition CPI
(Laspeyres), which remained flat during this period. The Sato-Vartia and Feenstra-
adjusted Sato-Vartia index imply a drop in the cost of living by 12% and 20%
respectively. The flat UPI implies a drop in the cost of living by 26% and the nested
UPI implies a drop by 40% from 2006 to 2015. In terms of annual rates, as shown
in Panel (B2), the Laspeyres index gives an average annual inflation of 0.0%, the
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(A1) Chained Indices, Food (B1) Chained Indices, Non-Food













































(A2) Four-Quarter Change, Food (B2) Four-Quarter Change, Non-Food
































































(A3) UPI Components, Food (B3) UPI Components, Non-Food

































Common Goods Price Relative

































Common Goods Price Relative
Figure 3.4: Food vs. non-food price indices and the UPI decomposition. Panel (A1)
to (A3) are for the food sector and (B1)-(B3) for non-food. (A1) and (B1) plot the
chained indices with 2006 q1 normalized to 1. (A2) and (B2) plot the four-quarter
cumulative changes. (A3) and (B3) plot the components of the nested UPI.
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Sato-Vartia and Feenstra-adjusted Sato-Vartia indices give annual inflation rates of
−1.2% and −2.1% respectively. The flat UPI implies an annual inflation of −5.2%
and the nested UPI implies an annual rate of −3.1%.
Panel (A3) and (B3) show the four components of the nested UPI. UPC entry
and exit are more quality enhancing in the non-food sector, with and average annual
rate of −1.3%. While in the food sector, the rate is only -0.4%. This UPC entry
and exit adjustment term suggests that there are more innovation in the non-food
sector compared to food. Firm entry and exit adjustments are flat in both sectors.
The Jevons index is more negative in the non-food sector, suggesting that firms
lower product prices over time. This may also be a result of innovation, where
successful innovations help firms to lower marginal costs and hence reduce prices
to gain market share. Meanwhile, the Jevons index demonstrates similar cyclical
fluctuations in both food and non-food sectors. The consumer valuation adjustment
is positive in the food sector but negative in the non-food sector, suggesting that
consumer expenditure in the food sector have become less disperse over time while
is has become more disperse in the non-food sector.
The gap between the flat and nested UPI is mainly attributable to the con-
sumer valuation bias term which is higher in the flat UPI than in the nested UPI
for both sectors. The CV term in the flat UPI measures the effect of relative taste
shocks across all goods in a sector, while the CV term in the nested UPI measures
the average effect of relative taste shocks between goods within a firm in the sector.
The high CV in the flat UPI suggests that within a product group, small share goods
tend to receive positive taste shocks relative to large share goods, so that expendi-
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ture shares have become less dispersed over time. The low CV in the nested UPI
says that within a firm, large share goods tend to receive positive demand shocks
and grow even larger, so the dispersion of expenditure shares of goods within a firm
has become more dispersed over time.
3.6.4 Empirical Test of Proposition 1
Now I test the predictions of Proposition 1 and Redding and Weinstein (2020)
based on the empirical strategy described in 3.3.2.2. In the first step, I estimate
the correlation between initial period market shares and relative taste shocks for
each product group (ag), and the correlation between changes in market shares and
relative taste shocks for each product group (bg). In the second step, I estimate the
relationship between ag, bg and the consumer valuation bias.
If Proposition 1 holds in the data, we should expect to see that the slope be-
tween ag and CVg to be negative, i.e. the more correlated the initial size of a product
and relative taste shocks, the more negative the consumer valuation bias term. If
RW’s argument holds in the data, we should expect to see that the more correlated
the relative taste shocks and the change in market share, the more negative the
consumer valuation bias.
Figure 3.5 shows the results. Panel (A) shows that indeed, there is negative
relationship between consumer valuation bias and ag, the correlation between initial
market share and relative taste shocks. The estimated coefficient β (equation 3.16)
is −0.14 with a standard error of 0.015.13 On the other hand, there isn’t a negative
13The estimation in the second step may be subject to generalized regressors problem where the
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(A) Initial Market Share and CV (B) Change in Market Share and CV


















































Figure 3.5: Test predictions of Proposition 1. Panel (A) plots the relationship
between the estimated correlation between the initial market share of products and
relative taste shocks and the size of the consumer valuation bias across all product
groups. Panel (B) plots the relationship between the estimated correlation between
changes in market share of products and relative taste shocks and the size of the
consumer valuation bias across all product groups.
correlation between consumer valuation bias bg, and the correlation between change
in market share and relative taste shocks. Panel (B) shows that consumer valuation
bias and bg is instead positively correlated. The estimated coefficient γ (equation
3.17) is 0.05 with a standard error of 0.01. Therefore, the RW’s argument doesn’t
hold in the data.
In sum, Proposition 1 holds in the data and suggests that the sign of the
consumer valuation bias is determined by the correlation between the initial period
size of a product and relative taste shocks. Therefore, taste shocks to products of
large firms may have different price impact from taste shocks to products of small
firms.14
ag it self is a random variable. Methods such as bootstrapping can be used to get a more precise
standard error on β.
14Hottman et al. (2016) shows that products in large firms tend to be large in size.
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3.6.5 Contribution of Large Firms to the Cost of Living
An advantage of the nested structure is that it allows me to analyze firms’
contribution to the cost of living systematically. In particular, it allows me to study
how firms affect the components of the nested UPI. I perform counterfactual ex-
periments where I set firm price indices of top 5, 10, and 20 firms (in terms of
expenditure shares) in each product group to be constant over time, and evaluate
what the aggregate UPI would be under these scenarios. I also re-normalize the
Sato-Vartia weights so that the change in the prices indices will not be biased me-
chanically towards zero. Such experiments are equivalent to dropping corresponding
firms from the sample. In the nested CES setting, dropping firms effectively shuts
down substitution of goods between firms while the substitution within firms is
unaffected.15
3.6.5.1 The Aggregate Consumer Goods Sector
I first look at the aggregate consumer goods sector. Figure 3.6 shows the
result. Without top 5 firms in each product group, the cumulative change in the
cost of living would have increased by 14% from 2006 to 2015. Further excluding
top 5 to 10 firms would have further increased the cost of living by 3%. Excluding
top 10 to 20 firms will not change the aggregate index further. In terms of annual
inflation rate, dropping top 5 firms would have increased the inflation rate from -1%
to 0.4%. The annual inflation rate would have increased to 0.7% when dropping top
15In contrast, in the flat UPI structure, dropping firms will affect the substitution both within
and between firms.
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(A) Chained Indices (B) Four-Quarter Change
























































Figure 3.6: UPI counterfactuals for the aggregate consumer goods sector. This
figure shows the nested UPI from the counterfactual experiments where I drop top
5, 10, 20 firms in terms of expenditure shares in each product group. Panel (A)
plots the chained indices and Panel (B) plots four-quarter cumulative growth rates.
10 firms and stays at 0.7% when further excluding firms between top 10 and top 20.
To understand what drives the change in the measured inflation, we can look
at the components of the nested UPI. Panel (A) of Figure 3.7 shows that firm
creation and destruction is productivity enhancing. Moreover, smaller firms have
more active entry and exit dynamics and contribute to the decline of the cost of
living. Panel (B) shows the contribution of product (UPC) entry and exit to the
aggregate cost of living. Without the top 20 firms in each product group, the
contribution of product entry and exit declined by 3 percent. This suggest that
the product creative destruction is more active in large firms than in small firms,
even though the difference is also significant (0.3% on an annual basis). Panel (C)
shows that the common good price relative declines more in small firms than in large
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(A) Firm Entry and Exit (B) UPC Entry and Exit
































































(C) Common Goods Price Relative (D) Consumer Valuation Bias

































































Figure 3.7: This figure shows components of UPI in the counterfactual experiments
where we drop top 5, 10, 20 firms in terms of expenditure shares in each product
group. Panel (A) plots the firm entry and exit adjustment component, Panel (B)
plots the UPC entry and exit adjustment component; Panel (C) plots the common
goods price relative (Jevons index) and Panel (D) plots the consumer valuation bias
term.
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firms, suggesting that smaller firms are more aggressive in reducing product prices.
Moreover, the difference mainly happens between the top 5 firms and the rest.
The consumer valuation bias exhibits the most significant change with and
without large firms, as shown in Panel (D) of Figure 3.7. If top 5 firms in each of
the product groups were excluded, the consumer valuation bias would have driven
up the cost of living by 32% from 2006 to 2015. Further excluding firms between
top 5 to top 20 will not change the consumer valuation bias further. The consumer
valuation bias term in the nested UPI measures the average dispersion of UPC
expenditure shares within firms. Results in Panel (D) implies that expenditure
share within small firms have become less dispersed over time. In other words,
small share products in small firms received positive relative taste shocks over time.
3.6.5.2 Electronics vs. Snacks
The results above are for the aggregate consumer goods sector represented by
all Nielsen product groups. There are also important heterogeneity across differ-
ent product groups. In particular, I compare two product groups: electronics and
snacks. Electronics is an innovation intensive product group and snacks belongs to
the food sector which is regarded as less innovation intensive.16
Figure 3.8 shows the results. Electronics exhibits deeper deflation compared
to snacks. The cost of living dropped by 80% in electronics between 2006 and 2015,
with an annual inflation rate of -15%. In snacks, in contrast, the cost of living only
16Admittedly, the coverage of electronics in Nielsen is limited but it does include products such
as computer software, video games, printers, and etc.
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(A) Electronics (Chained) (B) Snacks (Chained)




































(C) Electronics (4Q Change) (D) Snacks (4Q Change)




























































Figure 3.8: This figure shows UPI counterfactuals for electronics and snacks where
I drop top 5, 10, 20 firms in terms of expenditure shares in each product group.
Panel (A) and (B) plot the chained indices for electronics and snacks. Panel (C)
and (D) plot the four-quarter cumulative change for the two product groups.
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declined by 20% during the same period with an annual inflation rate of -2.8%. The
role of large firms are also different in the two product groups. Excluding the top 5
firms in electronics, the annual deflation rate deepened from 15% to 19%. The rate
stays at 20% when further excluding top 5 to top 20 firms. While in snacks, the
cost of living in this sector increases without the large firms. Annual inflation rate
increases from −2.8% to 0.2% when excluding the top 20 firms.
To understand what drives the changes, Figure 3.9 compares the UPI compo-
nents in the experiments for these two product groups. A vary noticeable feature for
electronics, as shown in Panel (A2), is the significant contribution of the UPC entry
and exit component which averaged at -21%, indicating a very intensive creative
destruction process in this sector. Moreover, the product-level creative destruction
is more significant in large firms. Excluding the top 5 firms, the UPC entry and exit
component shrinks to -13% and the rate further shrinks to -6% when excluding the
top 20 firms. In contrast, in snacks, there is almost no contribution to the cost of
living from product entry and exit.
The second most noticeable component for electronics is the consumer valua-
tion bias term, as shown in Panel (A4) of Figure 3.9. It is positive in the baseline
case and declines as I drop the top firms. This suggests that the within firm expendi-
ture dispersion is lower in large firms. Given Proposition 1, this result suggests that
within large firms, relative taste shocks favor small share products. The consumer
valuation bias term averaged around 0 in snacks and remains largely unchanged in
the counterfactual experiments, as shown in Panel (B4).
The common goods price relative is negative in electronics while it fluctuates
109
Electronics Snacks
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(A2) UPC Entry and Exit (B2) UPC Entry and Exit
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(A4) Consumer Valuation Bias (B4) Consumer Valuation Bias
































































Figure 3.9: Components of UPI under the counterfactual experiments for electronics
and snacks product groups. Panels (A1)-(A4) are for electronics. Panels (B1)-(B4)
are for snacks.
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around 0 for snacks, as shown in Panel (A3) and (B3). The negative Jevon index
suggests that in the electronics sector, firms lower prices over time. This can be a
result of cost savings through innovation or increased market competition. Moreover,
Panal (A3) also suggusts that small firms in electronics tend to lower price more
aggressively than large firms.
Finally, the firm entry and exit component is largely flat in both sectors.
3.6.6 Nested UPI with Firm-Level Taste Shocks
Finally, I turn to the comparison between the baseline UPI (defined in equation
3.36 through 3.38) and the UPI with firm-level taste shocks (full UPI) defined in
equation 3.41. Adding firm-level taste shocks allows me to look at the effect of
relative taste shocks between firms.
Figure 3.10 shows the comparison between the Laspeyres index, the flat UPI,
the baseline nested UPI and the full UPI for the aggregate consumer goods sector.
We can see that the full UPI exhibits significant volatility even though the average
inflation rate is the same as the rate implied by the baseline nested UPI.
The volatility is more noticeable when we look at quarterly series, as shown in
Panel (C). Even though the mean quarterly log change is 0% for both the baseline
and the full UPI, the volatility of the full UPI is 5 times larger and exhibits some
seasonal patterns. This volatility is fully driven by the consumer valuation bias
between firms, as shown by the green dotted line in Panel (C), suggesting that there
exist seasonal relative taste shocks between firms.
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(A) Chained Indices (B) Four-Quarter Change




















































(C) Quarterly Log Change


























Between firm consumer valuation bias
Figure 3.10: This figure compares the full UPI to other indices. Panel (A) shows the
chained indices and Panel (B) shows the four-quarter cumulative change. The solid
blue line is the Laspeyres index; the red dotted line is the flat UPI, the yellow dash
line is the nested UPI and the purple dash-dot line is the nested UPI with firm-level
taste shocks. The green dotted line is the between firm consumer valuation bias
term of the full UPI
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the measurement of the exact cost of living at the
presence of product and firm-level creative destruction and relative taste shocks
and the contribution to the living cost by firms of different sizes by utilizing the
UPI framework developed by Redding and Weinstein (2020). I show analytically in
a two-good economy that under the UPI framework, the correlation between firm
size and relative taste shocks determines the direction of the consumer valuation
bias. This is different from RW’s argument that relative taste shocks will always
introduce a negative consumer valuation bias to the traditional Sato-Vartia index.
I test this proposition using the inferred taste shocks from the UPI framework and
the estimated elasticity of substitutions. The results favor my proposition while
doesn’t favor the argument from RW. Such results also suggest that innovations may
not always reduce the cost of living for consumers. This happens when innovations
improve the relative appeal of small share goods and hence reduce the the dispersion
among substitutable goods.
I construct a nested UPI index which considers multi-product firms and the
different substitutability within and between firms. Using the Nielsen Retail Scanner
dataset, I show that the annual inflation rate measured by the nested UPI is -1%,
1% lower than the inflation measured by the Laspeyres index. For the food and
non-food sector, the measured inflation rate by UPI is 2.0% and -3.1% respectively,
compared to 3.0% and 0.0% measured by the Laspeyres index.
Through counterfactual experiments, I show that large firms help drive down
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the cost of living in aggregate by lowering the consumer valuation bias and their
roles can be different across sectors. In the innovation intensive sector (electronics),
large firms engage in more active product creative destruction which reduces the cost
of living. They also keep improving the relative appeal of their small share goods.
While in the less innovation-intensive sector (snacks), large firms drive down the cost
of living through improving their large share goods hence increase the dispersion of
expenditure shares and drive down consumer valuation bias.
Admittedly, data from Nielsen might not be ideal to measure the economy-
wide quality adjusted price since most of innovative items in the consumer basket
may not be sold in grocery stores. Transaction-level data from other sources, such
as NPD and online retailers can be utilized to perform further analysis.
The UPI framework is a tractable framework based on consumer demand the-
ory to study the exact cost of living. The availability of transaction-level big data
made it empirically possible to construct micro-macro consistent measure of price
indices and to study product and firm dynamics. Its limitation lies in its sensitivity
to small shares and the dependence on CES being appropriate in defining and mea-
suring the consumer demand and the elasticity of substitution. On this front, there
is ongoing work to compare this framework to other approaches such as hedonic
approaches (Ehrlich et al. (2020)). In practice, a limitation is the common goods
rule is ad hoc at this point. It would be interesting for future work to build models
of dynamics of product entry and exit that underlies the common goods rule.
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Appendix A:
A.1 Definition of the High-Tech Sector
We define high-tech based on the shares of workers in the STEM occupations of
science, technology, engineering, and math, based on the methodology developed by
Heckler (2005). High-tech sector in our analysis includes the following 14 four-digit
NAICS industries, similar as Decker et al. (2018).
NAICS Industry
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) High-Tech
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing
5112 Software publishers
5161 Internet publishing and broadcasting
5179 Other telecommunications
5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals
5182 Data processing, hosting, and related services
5415 Computer systems design and related services
Miscellaneous High-Tech
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing
5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services
5417 Scientific research-and-development services
Table A.1: High-Technology Industries
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A.2 An Occupation-Based Measure of Demand for Skills
In this section, I present a demand for skills measure for the high-tech sector
based on occupation using public available datasets.
The datasets used are 1980, 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census and ACS from
2005 to 2016 from IPUMS USA. We stack three consecutive years’ ACS to obtain
sample for the middle years (2006, 2009, 2012, 2015). The industry information in
Census and ACS are not ideal. We manually construct a crosswalk from Census
and ACS industry codes to NAICS2002 NAICS and keep the high-tech industries
defined in Appendix A.1.
The advantage of Census and ACS is that they keep the occupation informa-
tion for each individual. To define high and low skilled workers, I integrate the task
score for each occupation from David and Dorn (2013) and define high-skilled work-
ers as workers whose occupations have a higher-than-average abstract task score.
Our measure is robust to other classification of high and low skilled workers.
Figure A.1 shows the relative price and quantity series for alternative defi-
nitions of skill (eduction and task). The skill premium flattened at 2000 and the
flattening can be seen under both measures of skill.
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(A) Relative Price (B) Relative Quantity
Figure A.1: This figure plots the relative price and quantity of skill under alternative
definitions of skill. Panel (A) compares the relative price series. Panel (B) compares
the relative quantity series.
A.3 Final Good Producer’s Problem















The Lagrangian function of the problem is
L = PtYt −
∫
j∈Ωt










which further implies that






We choose the final good as the numeraire, i.e. Pt = 1.
A.4 Analysis of the Bellman Equation
ṽ(lsa−1) = max{lsa}
{
B̃(lsa)− w̃s(lsa + lf )
−ϕ
2
w̃s(lsa−1 + lf )
[(lsa + lf )− (1− δ)(lsa−1 + lf )
lsa−1 + lf
]2








Redefine r̂ = (r + ν)/(1− ν)
The FOC wrt lsa,t gives:
B̃′(lsa)− w̃s−ϕw̃s










ṽ(lsa) = 0 (A.5)
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Equation (A.5) and (A.6) give that along the balanced growth path,
ϕw̃s
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Let ā be the age when lsā = l̄, then I can solve (A.7) backwardly as:
ϕw̃s
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l̄ and ṽ(l̄) should satisfy:








r̂ + µ− λ(l̄)
1 + r̂




A.5 Existence and Uniqueness of l̄
This section shows under certain conditions, there exist a unique value of l̄ as
the solution to (A.9). To begin with, note that B(l̄) = B0l̄
η1 , where B0 = L
uη0.
119
Equation (A.9) can be written as:














Redefine l̄ = lL − lf , then I have
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LHS of equation (A.12) can be written as
LHS = 1 +
[
1− η1 + C · (r̂ + µ− λ0l̄θ) +
λ0θl̄
θ−1lf
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]−1
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r + µ− λ0l̄θ
]−1}
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+ l̄ + lf (A.14)
Define the LHS of equation (A.14) to be new f1 and RHS to be new f2. We want
to find conditions under which df1/dl̄ < df2/dl̄
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Multiply both sides by η1 +
λ0θl̄
r+µ−λ0 l̄θ
and organize the terms, we have





r + µ− λ0l̄θ





r + µ− λ0l̄θ
)







r + µ− λ0l̄θ
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 2
µ =Λ1 + Λ1λ(l
s





2)− µ][1 + λ(ls1)− µ](1− ν)3 + ...
Λ1(1− ν)ā−1Πā−2i=1 [1 + λ(lsi )− µ]λ(lsā−1) + ...
Λ1(1− ν)āΠā−1i=1 [1 + λ(lsi )− µ]
λ(lsā)
1− (1− ν)(1 + λ(lsā)− µ)
(A.15)
Define
M = Λ1 + Λ1(1− ν)[1 + λ(ls1)− µ] + Λ1(1− ν)2[1 + λ(ls1)− µ][1 + λ(ls2)− µ]...
+ Λ1(1− ν)ā−1Πā−1i=1 [1 + λ(lsi )− µ] + Λ1(1− ν)āΠāi=1[1 + λ(lsi )− µ]
1
1− (1− ν)(1 + λ(lsā)− µ)
Now let the kth term in equation (A.15) be combined with the (k− 1)th term
of M(1− µ)(1− ν), we have
µ+M(1− µ)(1− ν) = Λ1 + Λ1(1− ν)[1 + λ(ls1)− µ]...
+ Λ1(1− ν)2[1 + λ(ls1)− µ][1 + λ(ls2)− µ]...
+ Λ1(1− ν)ā−1Πā−1i=1 [1 + λ(lsi )− µ]...
+ Λ1(1− ν)āΠāi=1[1 + λ(lsi )− µ]
1
1− (1− ν)(1 + λ(lsā)− µ)
= M,
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So we can solve
M =
µ
1− (1− µ)(1− ν)
. (A.16)
A.7 Algorithm of Solving the Balanced Growth Path
In this section, I describe the computation algorithm.
Step 1: We solve for l̄ using equation (2.33) and calculate vs(l̄) using equation
(2.32).
Step 2: Define the policy function h(l) as the optimal choice of skilled labor
per product line when the skilled labor per product line in the end of the last period
is equal to l. We solve vs(l) and h(l) using backward induction. Given l̂s, h(l̂s),
we can solve ls, h(ls) and vs(l) such that h(ls) = l̂s, using the following equations
derived from the Bellman equation:
ϕws,s























− 1 + δ
]2
+
1 + λ(l̂s)− µs
1 + r
vs(l̂s) (A.18)
In our current model, for a given optimal choice of l in a certain period, there
may not be a solution so that in the long run, the choices converge to l̄, and may
actually fluctuate around l̄. We see our model as an approximation for a continuous
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time model. We will do backward induction starting from values close to l̄ and
get policy functions and value functions defined on a grid. Next, I interpolate
firms’ optimal choices when they do not fall exactly on the grids that are calculated
from the backward induction. Specifically, we choose a very small εl > 0, and let
h(l̄ − εl) = l̄ and vs(l̄ − εl) = vs(l̄)− εldvs/dl̄.












However, when the wage of the skilled worker ws,s is sufficiently high, µs may
be lower than λ(l̄), in which case the steady state with a positive entry does not



















1The conditions in Proposition 1 require that µs should satisfy the following conditions:























2This can be proved by noting that l̄ and vs are both decreasing functions of µ. If the term
inside the maximization operator is negative, µ needs to decline to make the entry condition holds,
and l̄ will rise, making it possible to violate µ > λ(l̄).
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Step 4: If there is a positive entry, Λs0 is a function of w
s,s and ξ. Otherwise,
Λs0 = 0.


















i=1 (1 + λ(l
s,s









1 + λ(ls,sā )− µs
)a−ā
, for a > ā.
We then calculate Λs0 as a function of µ
s based on the following equation:
µs = M × {Λs0λE(l
s,s










1 + λ(ls1)(1− ν) + ...
ā−1∑
a=2
λ(lsa)(1− ν)aΠa−1i=1 (1 + λ(lsi )− µ) + ...
(1− ν)āΠā−1i=1 [1 + λ(lsi )− µ]
λ(lsā)
1− (1− ν)(1 + λ(lsā)− µ)
}
(A.20)
Step 5: If there is a positive entry, we solve ws,s from the market clearing
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Figure A.2 shows how the initial skilled labor is determined in the model: ls0

















Figure A.2: Entry Decision
A.9 Firm Size Distribution
Let F (a, n) be the number of firms at age a with n product lines.
• When a = 1,
F (1, 1) = Λ0λ
E(ls0 − ξ). (A.23)
• When a > 1,













for n ∈ [1, 2a].
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F (a, n). (A.25)
Firm exit rate:










F (a, n) + ν. (A.26)
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startup deficit. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.
Lawrence F Katz and Kevin M Murphy. Changes in relative wages, 1963–1987:
supply and demand factors. The quarterly journal of economics, 107(1):35–78,
1992.
Lawrence F Katz et al. Changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality. In
Handbook of labor economics, volume 3, pages 1463–1555. Elsevier, 1999.
Tor Jakob Klette and Samuel Kortum. Innovating firms and aggregate innovation.
Journal of political economy, 112(5):986–1018, 2004.
Rasmus Lentz and Dale T Mortensen. An empirical model of growth through prod-
uct innovation. Econometrica, 76(6):1317–1373, 2008.
Wassily Leontief. Ein versuch zur statistischen analyse von angebot und nachfrage.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, pages 1–53, 1929.
133
Raven S Molloy, Christopher L Smith, Riccardo Trezzi, Abigail Wozniak, et al. Un-
derstanding declining fluidity in the us labor market. Technical report, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2016.
Ariel Pakes. A reconsideration of hedonic price indexes with an application to pc’s.
American Economic Review, 93(5):1578–1596, 2003.
Stephen J Redding and David E Weinstein. Measuring aggregate price indices with
taste shocks: Theory and evidence for ces preferences. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 135(1):503–560, 2020.
Diego Restuccia and Richard Rogerson. Policy distortions and aggregate produc-
tivity with heterogeneous establishments. Review of Economic dynamics, 11(4):
707–720, 2008.
Paul M Romer. Endogenous technological change. Journal of political Economy, 98
(5, Part 2):S71–S102, 1990.
Sergio Salgado. Technical change and entrepreneurship. Technical report, mimeo,
University of Minnesota, 2019.
Kazuo Sato. The ideal log-change index number. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, pages 223–228, 1976.
Joseph A Schumpeter. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1942.
Robert G Valletta. Recent flattening in the higher education wage premium: Polar-
ization, skill downgrading, or both? In Education, skills, and technical change:
Implications for future US GDP growth. University of Chicago Press, 2018.
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